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I. INTRODUCTION
For most of human history, the rape and sexual abuse of women
associated with the enemy was an expected spoil, inevitable by-product, or
legitimate tactic of war. Where gender violence was condemned,
humanitarian law—which primarily reflected the male experience with
armed conflict—conceptualized such conduct as an offense against a
woman’s dignity or a family’s honor.1 Thanks to the tireless work of
committed advocates, jurists, and diplomats,2 international law now treats
gender violence3 as a prosecutable crime against the physical and mental
1. See INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN

FIELD 17, 18 (Francis Lieber ed., Washington, Government Printing Office 1898)
(1863), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Instructions-govarmies.pdf. The instructions state that
[c]rimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, maiming,
assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if
committed by an American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants,
are not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which death is not
inflicted, the severer punishment shall be preferred.
Id. These instructions, commonly called the Lieber Code, governed the Union forces
during the United States Civil War and represent one of the first efforts to codify the
laws of war and designate rape as a war crime. See id. Subsequent codification efforts
did not follow this lead. The regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention on
Land Warfare (IV) euphemistically indicated that “family honour and rights . . . must
be respected.” See Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631. Even the 1949 Geneva
Conventions promulgated after World War II do not expressly categorize rape and
other acts of sexual violence as “grave breaches” of the treaties giving rise to a duty of
state parties to prosecute such crimes pursuant to principles of universal jurisdiction.
See id. art. 146-47. Rather, such acts are specifically prohibited elsewhere in the
treaties in provisions that give rise only to state responsibility. See id. art. 27. For
example, Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that women shall be
protected against “any attack on their honor, in particular rape, enforced prostitution, or
any form of sexual assault.” Id. The grave breaches regime does penalize a number of
violent acts, including torture, inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffering
or serious injury to body or health, that easily encompass acts of rape and other sexual
violence. See id. art. 147. Even the statute of the ad hoc criminal tribunal for
Yugoslavia did not enumerate acts of sexual violence as war crimes, although rape was
listed as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991,
arts. 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. The Rwanda
Tribunal’s Statute did enumerate rape, enforced prostitution, and other forms of
indecent assault as war crimes by virtue of its reproduction of Protocol II of the Geneva
Conventions governing non-international armed conflicts. See Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 2-3, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts art. 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]. As
discussed more fully below, the ad hoc international tribunals have issued important
rulings recognizing the existence of multiple crimes of sexual violence under
customary international law.
2. See Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall-Martinez, Ending Impunity for Gender
Crimes Under the International Criminal Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFFAIRS 65, 6669 (1999) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the negotiations surrounding the
gender provisions within the Rome Statute).
3. This Article will generally employ the term “gender violence” to refer to
violence committed on the basis of a person’s sex or gender. Although much gender
violence is sexual violence, the latter term excludes acts of persecution that are not
THE
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integrity of the victim. Indeed, with the promulgation of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
criminal tribunals, there is now strong law on the books enabling gender
crimes to be prosecuted as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the
predicate acts of genocide.4
Notwithstanding that such conduct is finally clearly unlawful under
international criminal law, the security of women in situations of armed
conflict or mass repression is little improved and in fact may have
worsened.5 Indeed, violence against women continues to be employed as a
deliberate “tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill fear in, disperse
and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group,”
as noted by Security Council Resolution 1820.6 Even where such acts are
not the result of an express governmental or group policy, gender violence
is regularly tolerated by authorities as a way to reward or re-energize
exhausted fighters and further terrorize, punish, or humiliate an enemy
community. Violence against women thus remains inherent to situations of
lawlessness as a cruel extension of the pervasive gender subordination
already endemic worldwide in times of relative peace and security. In
connection with the passage of Resolution 1820, Major General Patrick
Cammaert, a former U.N. peacekeeping commander, testified before the
Security Council that “[i]t has probably become more dangerous to be a
woman than a soldier in an armed conflict.”7
Although the substantive law concerned with gender violence is now
sexual in nature but that are still based upon sex or gender discrimination. Accord
HEALTH & CMTY. DEV. SECTION, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HOW TO GUIDE:
SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE PROGRAMME IN LIBERIA 7-8 (2001), available
at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3c4d6af24.pdf (defining “sexual violence” and
“gender-based violence”).
4. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5(1)(g), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (granting the ICC
jurisdiction to prosecute rape and other forms of sexual violence as crimes against
humanity when such crimes are “committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population”).
5. See Avril McDonald, The Year in Review, 1 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L.
113, 123 (1998) (noting that ninety percent of victims of today’s armed conflicts are
civilians, with women constituting a disproportionate number of civilian victims); see
also Mary Deutsch Schneider, About Women, War and Darfur: The Continuing Quest
for Gender Violence Justice, 83 N.D. L. REV. 915, 915-20 (2007) (citing statistics and
examples that illustrate women’s increased victimization in armed conflict and noting
that while male civilians are killed, female civilians are often raped then killed).
6. See S.C. Res. 1820, intro., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008) (recognizing
sexual violence as an issue of international security that impedes the establishment of a
durable peace). Resolution 1820 follows on the heels of Resolution 1325, which
considered the many ways in which conflict affects women and children, recognized
women’s role in preventing and resolving conflict, called for equal participation and
full involvement of women in efforts to maintain peace and security, and advocated a
gender perspective in peacekeeping. See S.C. Res. 1325, ¶¶ 2-5, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1325
(Oct. 31, 2000).
7. See Transcript of Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and
Security (June 19, 2008), http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/Open_Debates/Sexual
_Violence08/Cammaert.MONUC.pdf (promoting the inclusion of female military and
police personnel in U.N. peacekeeping missions to more effectively address the
increasing victimization of women and girls).
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well established, and the principle of legality can no longer serve as a
barrier to prosecutions for gender violence, significant obstacles remain to
ensuring a robust system of gender justice in international criminal law in
the face of continued violations.8 These obstacles are less visible than
defects in positive law because they emerge in the practice of international
criminal law at crucial yet shrouded stages of the penal process:
investigation, charging, pre-trial plea negotiations, trial preparation, the
provision of protective measures, and appeals.9 Most importantly, strong
positive law is irrelevant where a commitment to gender justice does not
infuse all stages of the development and implementation of a prosecutorial
strategy.10
The track record of gender justice before the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) provides a forceful object lesson for
prosecutors practicing before the International Criminal Court (ICC) and
other international criminal law tribunals into the ways in which crimes of
sexual violence can be poorly or under-prosecuted and thus rendered
invisible and un-redressed.11 Although gender violence in Rwanda did not
receive the levels of media attention focused on similar crimes committed
in the former Yugoslavia, the Rwandan statistics—inherently
approximate—are stunning. Estimates range from 250,000 to 500,000
rapes during the short period of the genocide, from April to June 1994.12
Rape in Rwanda was also accompanied by sexual mutilation and torture,
and women and girls were often literally raped to death by perpetrators
wielding machetes, sharpened sticks, broken bottles, and other
8. See JUDITH G. GARDAM & MICHELLE J. JARVIS, WOMEN, ARMED CONFLICT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 253 (2001) (recognizing the inclusion of gender violence and
armed conflict in international law, but maintaining that criminal punishment does not
prevent atrocities and further noting the lack of implemented legal norms to regulate
gender violence).
9. For a discussion of the appellate process before the ICTR as it relates to gender
crimes, see Patricia V. Sellers, The “Appeal” of Sexual Violence: Akayesu/Gacumbitsi
Cases, in Center for Human Rights, GENDER BASED VIOLENCE IN AFRICA:
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE CONTINENT 51, available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre_
publications/gender/Gender-based%20violence%20in%20Africa.pdf.
10. See Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related
Crimes Under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 288, 317 (2003) (noting that investigation, indictment, and
prosecution for gender crimes in the Rwanda and Yugoslav Tribunals occurred only
after widespread lobbying by women’s rights organizations and feminist scholars).
11. See Stephanie K. Wood, A Woman Scorned for the “Least Condemned” War
Crime: Precedent and Problems with Prosecuting Rape as a Serious Crime in the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 274, 299-301
(2004) (explaining that the ICTR initially failed to indict perpetrators for sexual crimes,
inadequately addressed the tension between legal justice and survivor interests, and
delayed arresting and prosecuting perpetrators of rape warfare); Sellers, supra note 9, at
60 (noting the when cases are improperly investigated or processed, it “re-enforces the
invisibility of the crimes and the invisibility of the mainly female victims or survivors
of the sexual violence”).
12. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights,
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/68
(Jan. 29, 1996) (discussing the methodology and difficulties in estimating the number
of rapes during hostilities); see also Wood, supra note 11, at 285-86 (citing these
statistics and noting the likelihood of under-reporting).
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implements.13 By some accounts, virtually all female survivors—including
very young girls—in Rwanda were raped or sexually assaulted during the
100 days of the genocide.14
Yet, the results of the cases before the ICTR do not reflect the high
levels of gender violence in Rwanda during the genocide.15 In fact, the
systemic lack of gender violence charges, and the high number of acquittals
for the charges that were brought, generates the opposite impression. This
disconnect lies at the heart of this paper, which will discuss the many ways
in which gender justice can be neglected or sidelined in international
criminal law with a particular focus on the history of gender justice
prosecutions before the ICTR and the decisions and practices of that
Tribunal’s Office of the Prosecutor. This study makes clear that where
gender violence is not central to a prosecutorial strategy, potential charges
become dispensable and charged crimes result in acquittals when subjected
to the adversarial criminal justice process. Although it is largely too late
for the women of Rwanda, the ICC—whose constitutive statute contains
groundbreaking and enlightened structural, procedural, and substantive
provisions to ensure gender justice—must generate better results for
women victims elsewhere and ensure that the missteps, carelessness, and
neglect characterizing gender justice before the ICTR are not repeated.
II. PREVENTING SELECTIVE JUSTICE
Before commencing investigations and drafting indictments, a
prosecutor must devise and continue to develop a coherent strategy for how
crimes of sexual violence in the relevant region are to be investigated,
charged, prosecuted, proven, and appealed in the face of acquittals. This
requires a thorough knowledge of the applicable substantive law and the
way in which gender violence manifested itself within the region in
question. Although this process is facilitated and enhanced by the
13. See BINAIFER NOWROJEE, U.N. RESEARCH INST. FOR SOC. DEV., “YOUR JUSTICE
TOO SLOW”: WILL THE ICTR FAIL RWANDA’S RAPE VICTIMS? 1 (2005) (quoting
ICTR testimony regarding the atrocities perpetrated against women in Rwanda). Major
Brent Beardsley, the assistant to Major-General Roméo Dallaire, force commander of
the U.N. peacekeeping force in Rwanda, was once asked before the ICTR to describe
the female corpses he saw. He responded:
when they killed women it appeared that the blows that had killed them were
aimed at sexual organs, either breasts or vagina; they had been deliberately
swiped or slashed in those areas . . . . [G]irls as young as six, seven years of
age, their vaginas would be split and swollen from obviously multiple gang
rape, and they would have been killed in that position.
Id.
14. See AFRICAN RIGHTS, RWANDA: DEATH, DESPAIR AND DEFIANCE (1995) (first
NGO account of the extent of the genocide in Rwanda); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND ITS
AFTERMATH 24 (1996) (noting that the exact number of gender-based crimes
perpetrated during the genocide is unknowable).
15. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 3 (explaining that, as of May 2004, the
Prosecutor’s Office did not bring rape charges in seventy percent of ICTR cases and
that there is only a ten percent conviction rate in the cases in which rape charges were
brought).
IS
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appointment of an on-site gender expert with the appropriate rank and
seniority to be effective,16 any gender violence policy must be fully
institutionalized and operationalized such that it infuses the hiring, training,
day-to-day activities, and evaluation of all prosecutorial staff. Any gender
violence prosecutorial strategy must also include the appointment of
women and gender experts to positions of influence and to posts that
require contact with female victims.17 Such a policy must be continually
monitored to ensure that different investigative and trial teams are
prosecuting gender violence consistently over time.18
Although there have been setbacks in gender justice before all the ad hoc
tribunals19 and during all phases of the ICTR’s work,20 critiques by
advocates of gender justice tend to focus on the tenure of Swiss jurist Carla

16. No gender advisor within the ICTY or ICTR had a U.N. rank higher than P-4,
which excluded them from high-level policy discussions.
17. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 90 (reporting that victims
indicated they would only discuss sexual violence with a female investigator); see also
Wood, supra note 11, at 305-06 (noting that the ICTR had fewer women personnel
than other tribunals and that this likely undermined the tribunal’s ability to indict for
sex crimes).
18. See Valerie Oosterveld, Gender-Sensitive Justice and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Lessons Learned for the International Criminal Court,
12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 119, 127 (2005) (explaining that inconsistent policies
result in improper gathering of evidence, missed opportunities for furthering
investigations, improper methodological practices, and failed prosecutions); Letter
from Human Rights Watch to U.N. Security Council Members, Rwanda and the
Security Council: Changing the International Tribunal (Aug. 1, 2003),
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/08/01/rwanda-and-security-council-changinginternational-tribunal (noting decline in attention to and indictments for gender crimes);
see also Gaëlle Breton-LeGoff, Analysis of Trends in Sexual Violence Prosecutions in
Indictments by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) from November
1995 to November 2002, Nov. 28, 2002, http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/
advocacyDossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDeniedJustice/analysisoftrends_en.php (noting
that the prosecution of sexual violence in the ICTR increased between 1998 and 2001,
but subsequently decreased).
19. See LaShawn R. Jefferson, In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s
Status, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 325, 337 (2004), available at
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download/wr2k4.pdf (stating that “both [the ICTR
and the ICTY] have been plagued by weak investigations and neither has had an
effective long-term prosecution strategy that acknowledges the degree of wartime
sexual violence suffered by women”).
20. See The Secretary-General, Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in
the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994:
Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services, Annex: Summary, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/789
(Feb. 6, 1997) (discussing administrative, leadership, and operational shortcomings of
the tribunal and expressing concern about its ability to administer justice in Rwanda).
The ICTR took considerable time to reach its stride in the face of allegations of
nepotism, corruption, and incompetence on all fronts, not just with respect to the
prosecution of gender violence. See id. (reporting that “serious operational deficiencies
in the [m]anagement of the Tribunal . . . developed virtually from its inception”). In
addition, the relentless Completion Strategy mandated by the U.N. Security Council
undoubtedly has weighed against the expansion of current proceedings in any fashion.
See S.C. Res. 1503, ¶¶ 3-7, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) (initiating
completion strategy and calling upon the ICTR to complete its work by 2010).
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Del Ponte as ICTR Chief Prosecutor (1999-2003).21 Overall, it appears that
Del Ponte and her staff in Rwanda proceeded without a coherent strategy
for investigating sexual violence or a theory of how sexual violence fit into
the way in which genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity were
committed in Rwanda. As a result, during much of this time, the
prosecutor’s office neglected, de-emphasized, or at times botched the
prosecution of crimes of sexual violence committed in Rwanda.22 A 2003
letter to Del Ponte from one NGO dedicated to ensuring that the ICTR
protects the rights and interests of Rwandan women memorialized these
concerns: “we believe that your four-year record as ICTR prosecutor shows
no concrete commitment to effectively developing evidence to bring such
charges, despite the longstanding and overwhelming proof of sexual
violence during the 1994 Rwandan genocide.”23 Several policies and
practices of the Office of the Prosecutor are specifically singled out for
criticism as discussed more fully below.
A. The Investigation Stage
Since a prosecutor can only charge those crimes of which he or she is

21. See, e.g., NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 8 (noting a particular lack of political
will to prosecute sexual violence during Del Ponte’s tenure). As originally conceived,
the ad hoc criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda shared a Chief Prosecutor,
who was located in The Hague. Justice Richard Goldstone (South Africa) first
occupied this post starting in 1994. See id. at 9. In 1996, he was replaced by Canadian
jurist Louise Arbour, who served until 1999, when Swiss former prosecutor Carla Del
Ponte next occupied the position. See id. at 9-10. In 2003, as part of the Completion
Strategy devised for the two ad hoc tribunals, the Security Council appointed Hassan
Bubacar Jallow of Gambia as Chief Prosecutor for the ICTR, over Del Ponte’s
objection. See id. at 11; see also S.C. Res. 1503, Annex I, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1503/Annex I (Aug. 28, 2003) (granting the Secretary-General the authority to
nominate the tribunal prosecutor). When Del Ponte stepped down from the ICTY,
Belgian prosecutor Serge Brammertz assumed the ICTY position effective January 1,
2008. See Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Statement of Serge Brammertz, Prosecutor of the ICTY (Jan. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2008/pr1212e.htm
(accepting
appointment
as
Prosecutor).
22. See, e.g., NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 8-19 (detailing multiple defects in the
prosecutorial strategy before the ICTR, including a lack of political will to prosecute
gender violence, poor investigations, prosecuting with inadequate evidence, and failure
to file timely appeals after rape acquittals).
23. Letter from Ariane Brunet, Coordinator for Women’s Rights, Rights &
Democracy, on behalf of the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict
Situations, to Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(Mar. 12, 2003), available at http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacy
Dossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDeniedJustice/lettertoprosecutor_en.php. The Coalition
expressed similar concerns in a letter to then Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Kofi Annan, who was at the time considering Del Ponte’s renewal. See Letter from
Ariane Brunet, Coordinator for Women’s Rights, Rights & Democracy, on behalf of
the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, to Kofi Annan, U.N.
Secretary General (July 24, 2003), available at http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/
site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDeniedJustice/lettrekofiannan_en.php.
Several days later, Annan announced the bifurcation of the Chief Prosecutor
position and appointed Jallow as the Chief Prosecutor dedicated to Rwanda. See “New
Rwanda Prosecutor Named,” BBC NEWS, Aug. 29, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/3190833.stm (last visited May 21, 2009) (describing Del Ponte’s clashes
with the Rwandan government, leading up to the Jallow appointment).
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aware and that are supported by sufficient admissible and probative
evidence, a thorough and effective investigation at the inception of a case is
crucial to ensuring that gender crimes are fully and successfully
prosecuted.24 Prosecutors and investigators must coordinate to ensure that
the latter are gathering the evidence upon which the former can build
accurate and comprehensive indictments.25 Having a coherent strategy for
prosecuting gender crimes is especially important as crimes with a sexual
component may be more difficult to investigate.26 In particular, locating
physical, documentary, and testimonial evidence that proves the
commission of sexual violence may present unique challenges27 as
compared to other crimes of violence that may be more visible or publicly
documented.28 Victims of sexual violence, both male and female, are often
initially unwilling to come forward to testify about such acts, and
investigators may be reluctant to pressure witnesses to reveal the full scope
of the harm suffered.29 In addition, there is a common perception that
women from patriarchal or traditional societies will simply not talk about
being sexually assaulted.30 Experience shows, however, that proper
investigative methodologies, utilized by sensitive and dedicated staff
members and support persons, can elicit valuable testimony and empower
women to participate effectively in prosecutions.31
24. See Stephanie N. Sackellares, From Bosnia to Sudan: Sexual Violence in
Modern Armed Conflict, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 155-56 (2005) (discussing
methods for improving future prosecutions for mass atrocities, such as those currently
occurring in Sudan).
25. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 12 (explaining that investigators in Kigali,
Rwanda, often gathered witness statements of only a few paragraphs that were of little
assistance to prosecutors). This coordination was hampered within the ICTR by the
fact that many investigators were located in Kigali, Rwanda, whereas the prosecutors
were more often in Arusha, Tanzania, where the Tribunal is located. See id.
26. See Alex Obote-Odora, Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR
Contribution, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 135, 156-57 (2005) (explaining that
the highly sensitive and traumatizing nature of sexual violence paired with Rwandan
women’s shyness and hesitance to discuss their experiences render investigations
difficult).
27. See id. at 140 (observing that “[s]ex-based crimes are not easily identifiable,
like gunshot wounds or amputated limbs. This is because these crimes inflict physical
and psychological wounds, which women can conceal to avoid further emotional
anguish, ostracism, and retaliation from perpetrators who may live nearby.”).
28. See ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Annex to the “Paper on Some Policy Issues
Before the Office of the Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications 1 (Sept. 2003)
(noting that the ease of investigation is a factor that is taken into account when deciding
on which situations to focus).
29. Binaifer Nowrojee, We Can Do Better: Investigating and Prosecuting
International Crimes of Sexual Violence (2004), http://www.womensrights
coalition.org/site/publications/papers/doBetter_en.php (noting that many investigators
are not specifically trained to elicit sensitive information from rape victims, and further
highlighting that many victims fail to come forward due to fear of rejection and
stigmatization).
30. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 9 n.8 (recounting an interview with ICTR
deputy prosecutor, who was quoted as saying, “African women don’t want to talk about
rape . . . . We haven’t received any real complaints. It’s rare in investigations that
women refer to rape.”).
31. See Nowrojee, supra note 29 (highlighting the effective use of an integrated
prosecutorial strategy, female investigators, and a sensitive interviewing methodology
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In several early ICTR cases, evidence about uncharged acts of sexual
violence emerged during trial through unsolicited witness testimony. The
Akayesu case provides the most famous example.32 There, two trial
witnesses gave testimony that they had been raped or that they had
witnessed the rape of others in Jean-Paul Akayesu’s commune.33 One
victim testified that she had never been asked about rape by tribunal
investigators.34 Learning of this testimony, the Coalition for Women’s
Human Rights in Conflict Situations (Coalition)35 submitted an amicus
curiae brief on behalf of over forty other NGOs and law clinics urging the
Trial Chamber to invite the prosecutor to amend Akayesu’s indictment to
charge rape as a war crime, a crime against humanity, and an act of
genocide.36 After continuing the trial to permit the prosecution to prepare
an amended indictment and the defense to meet the new charges,37 the

for prosecuting sexual violence before the U.N. Special Court for Sierra Leone).
32. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 416-417 (Sept. 2, 1998) (stating that “allegations of sexual violence first came to the
attention of the Chamber” when two witnesses were being examined, and noting that
the indictment was subsequently amended to include knowledge and facilitation of
sexual violence).
33. See id. ¶¶ 416, 421.
34. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Transcript, at pp. 00101-00102
(Jan. 27, 1997) (testimony of Witness J).
35. See Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations,
http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/main_en.php (last visited May. 21, 2009)
(explaining that the Coalition goals are “to promote the adequate prosecution of
perpetrators of gender violence in transitional justice systems based in Africa, in order
to create precedents that recognise violence against women in conflict situations [and
to] help find ways to obtain justice for women survivors of sexual violence”).
36. Brief for Al-Haq et al. as Amici Curiae Respecting Amendment of the
Indictment and Supplementation of the Evidence to Ensure the Prosecution of Rape
and Other Sexual Violence within the Competence of the Tribunal, ¶ 3, Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, available at http://www.womensrightscoalition.org
/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/Akayesu/amicusbrief_en.php.
37. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 417 (noting
amendment of indictment in light of the testimony of Witnesses H and J). In the
process of amending the indictment, both the Trial Chamber and the prosecution denied
that they were responding directly to the amicus brief. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Transcript, at p. 8 (June 17, 1997). Pierre Prosper said for the
prosecution:
I would like to say to this Chamber right now and make it perfectly clear that
the amicus curiae is not motivating us today. It is not motivating us today and,
in fact, it can only be considered as a factor. And I say this is a factor because
what it does is it reminds us of the importance of the issue of sexual violence.
Id. Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber acknowledged the brief in its judgment. See
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 417.
The Chamber understands that the amendment of the indictment resulted from
the spontaneous testimony of sexual violence by witness J and H during the
course of this trial and the subsequent investigation of the prosecution, rather
than from public pressure. Nevertheless, the Chamber takes note of the
interest shown in this issue by non-governmental organizations, which it
considers as indicative of public concern over the historical exclusion of rape
and other forms of sexual violence from the investigation and prosecution of
war crimes.
Id.
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ICTR convicted Akayesu of aiding and abetting38 crimes against humanity
and genocide for acts of rape that took place in the vicinity of his office.39
In this landmark ruling, which signifies the high water mark for gender
justice before the ICTR, the Chamber defined rape and sexual violence
under international law for the first time in history.40
Similar
41
42
amendments were allowed in some subsequent cases.
38. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 694-697
(finding Akayesu criminally responsible under Articles 3(g), 3(i), and 6(1) of the Rome
Statute for multiple acts of gender-based violence, including rape). Specifically, the
Chamber held that Akayesu was responsible for these acts “by allowing them to take
place on or near the premises of the bureau communal and by facilitating the
commission of such sexual violence through his words of encouragement in other acts
of sexual violence which, by virtue of his authority, sent a clear signal of official
tolerance for sexual violence, without which these acts would not have taken place.”
Id. ¶ 694. The Chamber disregarded the evidence in the record concerned with sexual
assaults committed outside the bureau communal on the ground that the indictment
alleged only Akayesu’s responsibility for acts “on or near” the compound. See id.
¶ 689.
39. Akayesu was acquitted on the war crimes counts, charged as outrages upon
dignity under Protocol II of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, based on the Trial
Chamber’s ruling that the prosecutor had failed to demonstrate that the events in Taba
Commune were sufficiently connected to the armed conflict between the Rwandan
government and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) being fought elsewhere
in the country. See id. ¶¶ 640, 643. The prosecution had evidence that Akayesu wore a
military jacket, carried a weapon, and assisted the members of the military upon their
arrival in Taba Commune. However, this was deemed insufficient to trigger the
applicability of the war crimes prohibitions in the ICTR Statute. See id. ¶¶ 641-644.
The prosecution successfully appealed the legal standard the Trial Chamber employed
when it held that the defendant must be shown to be a commander, combatant, or other
member of the armed forces to be guilty of war crimes; however, the Appeals Chamber
left the verdict on the war crimes counts untouched. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR 96-4-A, Appeal Chamber Judgment, ¶ 445 (June 1, 2001) (finding that the
Trial Chamber erred in “restricting the application of common Article 3 to a certain
category of persons”).
40. See Askin, supra note 10, at 318 (heralding the Akayesu decision for its
landmark recognition of sexual violence as an instrument of genocide and for
formulating “seminal definitions of a rape and sexual violence under international
law”). Specifically, the ICTR ruled as follows:
The Tribunal considers that rape is a form of aggression and that the central
elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description
of objects and body parts. The Tribunal also notes the cultural sensitivities
involved in public discussion of intimate matters and recalls the painful
reluctance and inability of witnesses to disclose graphic anatomical details of
sexual violence they endured . . . . The Tribunal defines rape as a physical
invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which
are coercive. The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as
any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances
which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the
human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even
physical contact . . . . The Tribunal notes in this context that coercive
circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. Threats,
intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or
desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain
circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe
among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 687-688.
41. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al., Case No. ICTR 2000-56-I,
Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 50 for Leave to Amend the Indictment
Issued on 20 January 2000 and Confirmed on 28 January 2000, ¶ 26 (Mar. 26, 2004)
(citing prosecutor’s reliance on the Akayesu proceedings in support of efforts to amend
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In other cases, however, the Trial Chamber was not so generous in
allowing for eleventh hour amendments on the basis of evidence emerging
for the first time at trial.43 In Prosecutor v. Bagambiki (also known as the
Cyangugu trial), for example, female witnesses once again began giving
testimony at trial about sexual violence they experienced in the relevant
prefecture. Once again, the Coalition moved to appear as amicus, urging
the Tribunal to call upon the prosecution to consider amending the
operative indictment44 to include sexual violence charges45 based upon
the indictments and subsequently amending the indictment to include rape as a crime
against humanity). Although many ICTR indictments were eventually amended, often
by Jallow as Chief Prosecutor, there is the impression that some amendments were
hastily drafted primarily to appease international NGOs without sufficient evidentiary
support. See Jefferson, supra note 19, at 340. Human Rights Watch notes that “NGOs
have expressed concerns . . . that this strategy will undermine the tribunal’s long-term
effectiveness regarding the prosecution of sexual assault.” Id.
42. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nizeyimana & Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR 00-55-I,
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Severance and Leave to Amend the
Indictment Against Idelphonse Hategekimana, ¶¶ 26-30 (Sept. 25, 2007) (allowing
amendment of an indictment issued in 2000 to clarify and expand the charges of rape).
In Hategekimana, the Trial Chamber allowed Jallow to amend the existing indictment
to add new rape and individual responsibility allegations (including liability for
participating in a joint criminal enterprise) in support of the existing genocide and
crimes against humanity counts. See id. ¶¶ 25, 27-28. Although the Trial Chamber
ruled that some of these amendments were supported by newly obtained evidence not
available to the prosecution until 2006, with respect to the allegations that were not
new, the Trial Chamber ruled that the prosecution was not trying to obtain an unfair
advantage by seeking to add them at the time. See id. ¶ 28. The Chamber determined
that the allegations would “provide the accused with better notice of the case against
him and allow the Defence to better focus its investigation and case.” Id. The
prosecution’s request to refer the case to Rwanda was subsequently denied. See
Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR 2000-55B-R11bis, Decision on
Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of the Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to
Rwanda, ¶ 78 (June 19, 2008).
43. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al., Case No. ICTR 99-50-I, Indictment,
¶¶ 5.37, 6.65 (May 9, 1999) (alleging acts of sexual violence around Rwanda against
Tutsi individuals and charging defendants with rape as a crime against humanity and a
war crime). Jallow later sought to amend this indictment to clarify and expand upon,
inter alia, the sexual violence allegations and to focus on the role of the accused in
ordering, inciting, committing, aiding, and abetting the crimes in question. See
Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al., Case No. ICTR 99-50-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s
Request for Leave to File an Amended Indictment, ¶ 5(b)-(d) (Oct. 6, 2003). The Trial
Chamber denied the motion, which was filed a few months before the scheduled start
of trial, on the ground that a late amendment involving substantial changes would
prejudice the accused and delay the trial. See id. ¶ 35. The Appeals Chamber
determined that the Trial Chamber did not exceed its discretion when it failed to
authorize amendment under the circumstances. See Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al.,
Case No. ICTR 99-50-AR5, Decision on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal against
Trial Chamber II Decision of 6 October 2003 Denying Leave to File Amended
Indictment, ¶ 21 (Feb. 12, 2004).
44. See Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situation, Failure to
Charge Sexual Violence in the Cyangugu Case, http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/
site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/index_en.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2009) (describing the
Coalition’s efforts in the Bagambiki case). See also Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No.
ICTR 96-10-I, Amended Indictment, Count 1-6 (Jan. 26, 1998) (charging the accused
persons with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity for killing,
exterminating, and causing bodily harm to members of the Tutsi group without
explicitly charging them with sexual violence or rape); Prosecutor v. Bagambiki &
Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR 97-36-I, Indictment, ¶ 4 (Oct. 9, 1997). Eventually, the
Bagambiki & Imanishimwe case and the Ntagerura case were joined. See Prosecutor v.
Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR 96-10-I, Prosecutor v. Bagambiki et al., Case No. ICTR 9736-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Joinder, ¶ 60 (Oct. 11, 1999). The

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2009

11

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4

evidence in the public domain about the prevalence of genocidal sexual
violence in Cyangugu.46 This time, however, the prosecution joined the
defense in opposing the Coalition’s motion, arguing that the choice of
which charges to bring was dedicated to prosecutorial discretion.47 The
prosecution also indicated its intention48 to submit a new indictment
including rape allegations against at least two of the accused, thus mooting
the amicus. Siding with the parties, the Chamber denied the Coalition’s
motion on the grounds that the question was no longer a live one and that it
was beyond the Trial Chamber’s power to order an amendment.49
Accordingly, the Trial Chamber excluded evidence of uncharged crimes of
sexual violence fearing prejudice to the accused.50 This required female
witnesses to artificially truncate their testimony.51
The Tribunal
Prosecutor had earlier moved to amend the indictments to charge rape, but later
withdrew that motion. See Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T,
Decision on the Application to File an Amicus Curiae Brief According to Rule 74 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Filed on Behalf of the NGO Coalition for
Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, ¶ 9 (May 24, 2001) [hereinafter
Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Decision on the Application to File an
Amicus Curiae Brief].
45. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 14-15 (noting that strong evidence of gender
violence existed, in particular against Imanishimwe, who had allegedly raped a woman
himself and killed a woman by shooting a gun into her vagina).
46. See, e.g., Monique Kankera, Sexual Violence in Cyangugu: A Testimonial,
RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY, Oct. 20, 2001, http://www.dd-rd.ca/english/commdoc/
publications/women/bulletin/vol4no1/testimonialCyangugu.html (noting 132 cases of
reported rape in Cyangugu and citing other specific instances of sexual assault).
47. See Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Decision on the Application to
File an Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 44, ¶ 9.
48. See id. ¶ 10; see also Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T,
Decision on the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situation’s Motion
for Reconsideration of the Decision on Application to File an Amicus Curiae Brief, ¶ 8
(Sept. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Decision on the
Coalition’s Motion for Reconsideration] (noting that the prosecutor indicated her
intention to submit a separate indictment “with respect to the matter in question”);
Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations, This Year’s Monitoring
Projects on Gender-Related Crimes at the ICTR, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONFLICT SITUATIONS NEWSL. (Rts. & Democracy, Montreal, Que.), October 20, 2001,
available
at
http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/publications/index.php?id=1272&page=2&
subsection=catalogue (welcoming the prosecutor’s assurance that charges of sexual
violence would be filed).
49. See Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Decision on the Application to
File an Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 44, ¶¶ 20-22 (May 24, 2001). The Coalition
moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Trial Chamber had misapplied Rule 74
governing the submission of amicus briefs on the ground that its decision could be read
to prohibit amicus intervention in relation to issues that are not already under
consideration by the Trial Chamber, which would effectively prevent the participation
of underrepresented groups in the development of the law. See Ntagerura et al., Case
No. ICTR 99-46-T, Decision on the Coalition’s Motion for Reconsideration, supra note
48, ¶ 2. This motion was also denied on the ground that reconsideration was inapposite
under the circumstances as “no new and potentially decisive fact” had been discovered.
See id. ¶ 9.
50. See Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Decision on the Application to File an
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 44, ¶¶ 23-24 (noting that the Chamber must exclude
evidence of uncharged crimes).
51. Accord Michelle Staggs Kelsall & Shanee Stepakoff, “When We Wanted to
Talk About Rape”: Silencing Sexual Violence at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 1
INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 355, 363-74 (2007) (studying the exclusion of evidence
during the Civil Defence Forces case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone and
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subsequently acquitted two of three defendants for lack of evidence,52
generating outrage in Cyangugu, where women’s groups had meticulously
gathered data on sexual crimes53 committed in their community.54
Ultimately, the new indictment the prosecution promised never
materialized.

demonstrating that women can be psychologically harmed when their stories of rape
and sexual violence are silenced in criminal proceedings).
52. See Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶¶ 804-807 (Feb. 25, 2004). In addition, many allegations in the indictment
were disregarded as defective or unacceptably vague. See id. ¶¶ 64-68. The Appeals
Chamber affirmed the acquittals and set aside several convictions of defendant
Imanishimwe. See Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR 99-46-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 129 (July 7, 2006).
53. See, e.g., Kankera, supra note 46 (discussing victim testimonials about sexual
violence that were gathered from local women by AVEGA-Cyangugu, an organization
that works with widows in Rwanda). Indeed, subsequent Cyangugu indictments
detailed acts of sexual violence committed in the region. See Prosecutor v. Bizimungu
et al., Case No. ICTR 2000-56-I, Amended Indictment (Joinder), ¶ 117 (Aug. 23, 2004)
(stating that “[i]n Cyangugu, soldiers from the Rwandan Army and Interahamwe
regularly abducted Tutsi refugee women . . . and raped them and assaulted them
morally.”). The ICTR permitted Jallow to amend this indictment to add charges of rape
as a crime against humanity and accordingly granted additional time to the accused to
meet the new charges. See Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al., Case No. ICTR 200056-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Under Rule 50 for Leave to Amend the
Indictment Issued on 20 January 2000 and Confirmed on 28 January 2000, ¶¶ 50, 55
(Mar. 26, 2004). The case is ongoing.
54. Efforts to “fix” incomplete or weak indictments have yielded similar results in
a few cases before the ICTY. The most egregious is the Lukić case in which the
defendants were initially indicted for a number of crimes, but no crimes of gender
violence. See Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on
Prosecution Motion Seeking Leave to Amend the Second Amended Indictment and on
Prosecution Motion to Include UN Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) as
Additional Supporting Material to Proposed Third Amended Indictment as Well as on
Milan Lukić’s Request for Reconsideration or Certification of the Pre-Trial Judge’s
Order of 19 June 2008 (July 8, 2008) (discussing Prosecution’s motion to amend the
indictment to include new charges for rape). Under the leadership of Del Ponte, the
ICTY prosecutor’s office had indicated an interest in amending the indictment and was
given until November 2007 to do so. No amendment was forthcoming, ostensibly
because Del Ponte felt that to lengthen the prosecutor’s case would be contrary to the
Completion Strategy. After Del Ponte stepped down, Brammertz attempted to amend
the indictment well after the deadline for doing so. In addition to clarifying the charged
forms of responsibility, Brammertz sought to add new counts concerning the crimes of
rape, torture, and enslavement arising out of the defendants’ alleged establishment of a
rape camp. Many of the victims and witnesses to these crimes had already been
disclosed to the defendants. Indeed, eighteen of the twenty-six female witnesses on the
prosecutor’s witness list apparently had testimony about the defendants’ involvement
in sexual violence. In support of his untimely motion, Brammertz argued that the
crimes should be charged because of their grave and systematic nature; they were
integral to other persecutory policies employed in Višegrad; the prosecutor did not need
to call new witnesses; the defense would have adequate time to meet the new charges;
the testimony would assist the prosecutor in meeting the defendants’ apparent alibi
defenses; and, most importantly, the testimony was necessary “in the interest of
justice” in order to allow the witnesses to testify fully about the harm they suffered at
the hands of the defendants and to establish the full truth of the defendants’ crimes.
The ICTY denied the motion to amend the indictment on the ground that allowing the
amendment after the prosecutor’s unjustified delay would unduly prejudice the
accused. See id. ¶ 62. Bizarrely, the women will still testify in order to rebut the
defendants’ alibi defenses, but the gender crimes they will describe will be uncharged.
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The failure of prosecutorial personnel to surface allegations about sexual
violence in early investigations may be because the majority of the original
investigators were men drawn from national police or armed forces,55 with
little experience and training in taking rape testimony from female victims
and making it trial ready.56 Critics also point to the original lack of gender
justice expertise in the ICTR’s Office of the Prosecutor and the 2000
decision to disband the sexual assault investigative team.57 Early errors,
missteps, and omissions in the investigative phase inevitably reverberate
through subsequent proceedings and cases as the lack of a complete
investigation generates weaker evidence, which then justifies prioritizing
other charges with stronger evidentiary support.58 Collectively, these
factors create a self-reinforcing cycle of under-prosecution and impunity
vis-à-vis gender crimes. Properly investigating these situations ex ante
would have obviated the need to seek amendments after indictments had
been issued and even during trial, ensured cases went to trial without
evidentiary gaps, and avoided due process concerns for defendants, who
are entitled both to know the charges against them in advance and to a
speedy trial.
B. The Charging Phase
Even where investigations into gender crimes are rigorously conducted,
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with respect to which charges to
55. See Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 277, 280 (2002) (noting gender bias among investigators, limited
backgrounds and training of staff, and lack of female investigators); Peggy Kuo,
Prosecuting Crimes of Sexual Violence, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 305, 310-11
(2002) (recounting comments such as “‘I’ve got ten dead bodies, how do I have time
for rape? That’s not important,’ or, ‘So, a bunch of guys got riled up after a day of war,
what’s the big deal?’”).
56. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 12-13 (highlighting these problems as
undermining the effective prosecution of sexual violence by the ICTR). The ICTR
experienced a number of problems with their investigators. One investigator had
actually been working under a false name and was later indicted by the ICTR. See,
e.g., Prosecutor v. Nchamiligo, Case No. ICTR 2001-63-I, Amended Indictment (July
18, 2006).
57. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 9-10 (maintaining that the Office of the
Prosecutor lacked political will to investigate sexual violence during the early days of
the tribunal). But see Goldstone, supra note 55, at 280 (detailing how Justice
Goldstone responded to concerns about sexual violence prosecutions during his tenure
as the first ICTR prosecutor by appointing in 1994 Patricia Viseur Sellers as a Legal
Officer on Gender Issues for the Office of the Prosecutor to direct the indictment of
individuals responsible for gender violence crimes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda). Justice
Goldstone recalls that soon after he “arrived as the Chief Prosecutor in The Hague on
August 15, 1994, [he] was inundated with letters and petitions from women and men in
the United States, Canada, and many of the western European nations. The letters
implored [him] to give adequate attention to gender-related crimes.” Id. Prosecutor
Louise Arbour, who served from 1996-1999, increased efforts to prosecute gender
crimes and organized two gender training seminars for her staff in 1997. See
NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 9-10. The sexual violence unit was disbanded in 2000
under Del Ponte, although it was subsequently reconstituted in 2003 amid criticism of
her approach to gender violence. See id. at 10-11.
58. See Oosterveld, supra note 18, at 125-28 (discussing the “negative lessons
learned from the ICTR,” which include the lesson that inconsistent prosecution and
poor investigations lead to dropped charges and acquittals of sexual violence crimes).
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bring and how to frame them under the applicable law can result in the
exclusion of viable charges for gender violence.59 Obviously, there are
valid strategic reasons for issuing more simplified indictments and for
excluding certain charges even where sufficient evidence to convict may
exist.60 Particularly in international criminal law, the practical reality is
that prosecutorial and investigative resources are scarce, and the
international and hybrid tribunals will only pursue a small fraction of the
crimes committed in the relevant region or situation.61 In addition, since
the debacle of the Milosević super-indictment, international criminal law
has witnessed an emerging trend toward drafting more focused, symbolic,
or streamlined indictments. This seems to have occurred in the Lubanga
case before the ICC, which addresses only the conscription, enlistment, and
use of child soldiers in armed conflict, despite the fact that evidence in the
public realm strongly suggested the existence of other potential charges,
including charges of sexual violence. The perennial risk exists, however,
that such decisions will systematically exclude gender violence charges as
too difficult to prove or non-essential.62 In particular, there is a tendency to
view acts of gender violence committed during armed conflicts or
repression as simply opportunistic or as private crimes reflecting personal
motives and desires that are unconnected to, or simply capitalizing upon,
the prevailing state of war—an attitude that mirrors the public/private
divide that runs through much of law and society.63 To ensure against the
systemic exclusion of gender violence charges, such crimes must be treated
as integral to any armed conflict, genocide, or campaign of ethnic cleansing
rather than as isolated or peripheral phenomena. Such an approach reflects
the fact that gender violence is regularly employed alongside and to
exacerbate other forms of violence and repression.64
59. Cf. NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 10 (noting a significant decline in
investigations of sexual violence during Carla Del Ponte’s tenure as prosecutor, despite
strong evidence in support of sexual violence claims in the possession of the
prosecutor’s office).
60. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR 98-44C-T, Judgment,
¶¶ 20-22 (Sept. 20, 2006) (discussing how Rwamakuba’s case was severed from a joint
indictment, and a new indictment was issued, which focused more closely on the
defendant’s direct responsibility for a limited number of criminal events, rather than his
participation in a conspiracy or joint criminal enterprise). Although the joint
indictment charged rape as a crime against humanity, the rape charges were not
included in the new indictment. See id. ¶ 86 (stating the verdict on the counts charged).
61. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, A Word from the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT.
NEWSL. (In’l Crim. Ct., The Hague, Neth.) Nov. 2006, at 2 (“My office employs a
policy of focused investigations and prosecutions.”).
62. See Susan M. Pritchett, Entrenched Hegemony, Efficient Procedure, or
Selective Justice?: An Inquiry into Charges for Gender-Based Violence at the
International Criminal Court, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 293 (2008)
(observing that the frequent combination of gender violence with other war crimes
encourages prosecutors to select alternative charges).
63. See id. at 301-02 (noting that local laws sometimes punish rape lightly, or even
require rapists to marry their victims).
64. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶ 734 (Sept. 2, 1998) (noting that sexual violence was an integral part of the process of
destruction of the Tutsi group in Rwanda); see also S.C. Res. 1820, supra note 6, ¶ 1
(noting that sexual violence against women “can significantly exacerbate situations of
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Given their pervasiveness in situations of lawlessness, acts of gender
violence can be cumulatively charged under multiple genus crimes (e.g., as
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide) to ensure a conviction
where the particular circumstantial elements of each crime (e.g., the
existence of an armed conflict, a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population, or genocidal intent) might be difficult to prove.65 With
respect to war crimes, the drafters of the ICTR Statute borrowed directly
from existing treaty law by incorporating parts of Protocol II and Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.66 As such, the Statute penalizes
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault,”67
along with a number of generic crimes that may encompass gender
violence, including the commission of violence to life, health and physical
or mental well-being, cruel treatment, and torture.68
In order to convict an individual for war crimes, the prosecutor must also
demonstrate some nexus between the act committed and the armed
conflict.69 The struggle within the ad hoc tribunals to define this link
doctrinally became particularly acute in the Rwandan context, because
although the genocide occurred nationwide, the actual theater of war—
which pitted governmental armed forces against the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF)—only engulfed part of the country. This led to a number of
acquittals on war crimes counts, although most defendants were convicted
of genocide and crimes against humanity for the same acts, which require
no link to armed conflict. In the Kayishema case, for example, the Trial
Chamber ruled that it was insufficient to show merely a temporal
concurrence between the crimes charged and the internal armed conflict
being waged elsewhere in the country. Rather, the Trial Chamber required
a showing of a “direct link” between crimes committed and the hostilities70
and that the defendants were connected to one of the two embattled

armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security”).
65. See Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Report of the
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court: Part II: Finalized Draft
Text of the Elements of Crimes, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000)
(declaring that “particular conduct may constitute one or more crimes”).
66. See ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 4 (empowering the International Tribunal
for Rwanda to prosecute persons for war crimes committed in non-international armed
conflicts).
67. See id. art. 4, ¶ e (noting that this language is drawn from the “fundamental
guarantees” contained in Article 4 of Protocol II).
68. Cf. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 2 (noting that the ICTY Statute also
incorporated a composite of the Geneva Conventions’ grave breaches regimes, which
do not list rape or sexual violence as grave breaches, but rather penalize torture,
inhuman treatment, willfully causing great suffering, and willfully causing serious
injury to body or health).
69. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment,
¶ 169 (May 21, 1999) (setting forth the test for an act to breach Common Article 3 and
Protocol II).
70. See id. ¶ 185 (asserting that only crimes which occur in the context of war fall
within Common Article 3).
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parties.71 The Trial Chamber also noted that the armed conflict had been
used as pretext to unleash an official policy of genocide, but that these two
phenomena were distinct within the region in question.72
The ICTY Appeals Chamber ultimately rejected this approach in the
Yugoslavian context. In the Kunarac case, the Appeals Chamber ruled that
the armed conflict must only have “played a substantial part in the
perpetrator’s ability to commit [the charged crime], his decision to commit
it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was
committed,” and that it was enough if, as in the present case, “the
perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the armed
conflict.”73 The Tribunal identified a nonexclusive series of factors that
would help to guide this inquiry, which include: the perpetrator is a
combatant; the victim is a noncombatant; the victim is a member of the
opposing party; the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military
campaign; and the crime is committed as part of or in the context of the
perpetrator’s official duties.74 In the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, drafters
settled on the following formulation: it must be shown that the charged
conduct “took place in the context of and was associated with” an
international or non-international armed conflict.75 This formulation eases
up on the strict requirements established in Kayishema and seems to imply
the necessity of only a geographical and temporal nexus. As a result, it will
facilitate the prosecution of gender crimes as war crimes.76
Acts of gender violence may also be prosecuted as crimes against
humanity where they form part of a widespread or systematic attack against
a civilian population and there is evidence that the defendant knew of the
existence of the attack.77 The criteria of “widespread or systematic”
modify the attack against a civilian population, not the enumerated acts.78
As a result, isolated or discrete acts of sexual violence may be prosecuted
as crimes against humanity so long as they are part of a larger attack.
Although rape is the only crime of gender violence specifically enumerated
within the ICTR’s crimes against humanity provision,79 sexual violence
71. See id. ¶¶ 174-175. But see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-A,
Appeal Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 425-446 (granting the prosecution’s appeal of this
requirement by ruling that civilians can also be guilty of war crimes).
72. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 603. These defendants were
acquitted of war crimes, id. ¶ 615, and the prosecution did not appeal.
73. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 58 (June 12, 2002).
74. See id. ¶ 59.
75. See Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 65, art. 8
(declaring that a perpetrator’s knowledge of this nexus, plus the necessary acts, is
sufficient to establish the existence of war crimes).
76. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko & Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR 97-21-I,
Amended Indictment, count 11 (Mar. 1, 2001) (accusing Nyiramasukuko and Ntahobali
of the war crimes of humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, and indecent assault).
77. Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 65, art. 7(1)(a),
¶¶ 2-3.
78. Id. ¶ 2.
79. The Bucyibaruta and Munyeshyaka indictments contained extensive sexual
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could also be charged under the ICTR Statute’s gender-blind provisions
penalizing acts of torture,80 enslavement,81 persecution,82 and “other
inhumane acts,”83 because conviction for those crimes requires proof of
elements additional to those of rape.84 The latter “catch all” provisions of
persecution and inhumane acts are particularly useful for charging acts of
gender violence that fall short of rape (such as assault, forced nudity,

violation allegations, which the prosecutor charged as crimes against humanity (rape)
and genocide. Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I (June 16, 2005);
Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR 2005-87-I, Indictment (July 20, 2005).
The cases, however, were transferred to France (where the defendants were residing)
for prosecution pursuant to Rule 11bis. Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-0585-I, Designation of a Trial Chamber for the Referral of the Case to a State
(July 11, 2007), Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-87-I, Decision on
the Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to
France (Nov. 20, 2007). France is the first country to prosecute cases referred from the
ICTR in connection with the Tribunal’s Completion Strategy.
80. See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶ 295 (Dec. 10, 1998) (describing sexual assault as “a particularly vicious form of
torture”); see also Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, ¶¶ 488-499 (Feb. 20, 2001) (affirming conviction of rape as torture);
Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 506 (May
15, 2003) (entering cumulative convictions for rape and torture).
81. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 8 (Feb. 22, 2001) (convicting the defendants of gender-based
crimes, including enslavement).
82. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 1079 (Dec. 3, 2003).
Tutsi women, in particular, were targeted for persecution. The portrayal of the
Tutsi woman as a femme fatale, and the message that Tutsi women were
seductive agents of the enemy was conveyed repeatedly by [defendants’ media
outlets]. The [Hutu] Ten Commandments . . . vilified and endangered Tutsi
women . . . . By defining the Tutsi woman as an enemy in this way,
[defendants’ media outlets] articulated a framework that made the sexual
attack of Tutsi women a foreseeable consequence of the role attributed to
them.
Id. Notwithstanding this link between misogynist propaganda and sexual violence,
none of the media cases charged the defendants with inciting or instigating rape. See
id.; Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Amended Indictment, ¶ 5.7
(Dec. 10, 1998) (accusing Ruggiu of abetting the persecution of Tutsis by, among other
things, broadcasting messages that called for “acts of hatred and sexual violence”
against Tutsi women). See also Prosecutor v. Serugendo, Case No. ICTR 2005-84-I,
Corrigendum of Indictment (July 21, 2005). Both Ruggiu and Serugendo ultimately
pled guilty to incitement to genocide and persecution. Although the indictment in an
additional incitement case contained a number of general allegations of sexual
violence, the prosecution did not connect the alleged acts of incitement to these crimes
in the specific charges. See Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 2001-72-I,
Amended Indictment Pursuant to Decisions of 11 May 2005 and 10 June 2005
(June 15, 2005) (indicting the accused, a singer, for incitement). But see Prosecutor v.
Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 2001-72-T, Trial Chamber Judgment ¶ 47 (Dec. 2, 2008)
(finding that merely recording songs encouraging ethnic hatred did not necessarily
demonstrate genocidal intent).
83. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶¶ 688, 697 (Sept. 2, 1998) (remarking that “[s]exual violence falls within
the scope of ‘other inhumane acts,’ set forth [in] Article 3(i) of the Tribunal’s Statute,”
and emphasizing that Akayesu was judged criminally responsible under Article 3(i) for
forcibly undressing women and making them parade around in public).
84. See generally Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial
Chamber Judgment (Jan. 14, 2000) (establishing a regime for cumulative charging).
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etc.).85 Where more generic charges are utilized, however, there is a risk
that the gendered nature of the crimes will be obscured or rendered less
salient.
Finally, the Akayesu decision confirmed that acts of rape and sexual
violence may serve as the predicate acts of genocide along with murder and
assault. In particular, it ruled:
With regard [to] rape and sexual violence, the Chamber wishes to
underscore the fact that in its opinion, they constitute genocide in the
same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted
as such. Indeed, rape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction
of serious bodily and mental harm on the victims and are even, according
to the Chamber, one of the worst ways of [inflicting] harm on the victim
as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm . . . . These rapes
resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their
families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of
the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and
specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the
86
Tutsi group as a whole.

The Tribunal concluded that even those rapes that did not result in the
death of the victim could constitute genocide where “[s]exual violence was
a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group—destruction of the
spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.”87 The Trial Chamber
recognized that perpetrators often mutilated their victims before killing
them.88 The intent was to destroy the Tutsi group while inflicting acute
physical and mental suffering on its members in the process.89 In this way,
the Tribunal emphasized that both the mental and physical harm associated
with rape satisfied the actus reus of the crime of genocide.
In defending their charging decisions in the face of motions to dismiss
for defects in the form of the indictment, prosecutors must be able to
articulate why particular and cumulative charges are warranted under the
law. In particular, prosecutors must be able to demonstrate allegations
85. See ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 4(e) (reiterating that acts of sexual violence
can be charged as the war crime of “committing outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment”); see also Prosecutor v. Furundžija,
Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 295 (convicting defendant of
torture and outrages upon personal dignity for being present while a women was
repeatedly raped and humiliated); Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 &
IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 33 (convicting defendant where he
forced women to dance nude on a table while others watched).
86. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 731.
87. Id. ¶ 732.
88. Id. ¶ 731.
89. See id. (emphasizing that, unlike other depictions of genocidal rape, this
account of murderous genocidal rape does not depend upon rapes happening in a
“traditional” or patriarchal cultural milieu that values women’s chastity or fidelity); cf.
Adrienne Kalosieh, Note, Consent to Genocide? The ICTY’s Improper Use of the
Consent Paradigm to Prosecute Genocidal Rape in Foča, 24 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 121, 132 (2003) (emphasizing the religious and cultural characteristics of Bosnian
Muslim society in describing the genocidal impact of rape).
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relevant to all circumstantial and substantive elements of the crimes. In
addition, with respect to cumulative charges, prosecutors must be prepared
to educate the court about how cumulative charges can enhance the
expressive function of the law, create a fuller trial record of the nature of
the atrocities committed, and justify an elevated sentence where the extra
elements (e.g., the specific intent to cause severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, for torture or the discriminatory motive for persecution)
should be treated as an aggravating sentencing factor.90
Before the ICTR, many defendants91 were not charged with acts of
sexual violence in their initial indictments.92 Rather, these charges were
added by way of amendment, often upon motion by Hassan Bubacar Jallow
when he took over as Chief Prosecutor of the ICTR.93 In addition, there

90. See generally ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:
INTERNAL OTP DISCUSSION PAPER (2006) [hereinafter OTP, THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE] (detailing the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s bases for making the decision to
open investigations and begin prosecutions while taking into account the interests of
justice, the gravity of the crime, and the interests of the victim).
91. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR 96-17T, Amended Indictment, ¶ 1 (July 7, 1998) (charging genocide-related crimes, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23DP, Indictment, ¶ 1 (Oct. 16, 1997) (charging genocide, conspiracy to commit
genocide, direct and public indictment to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide
and crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-I,
Indictment (Feb, 13, 1996) (charging genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes); Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-I, Amended Indictment, ¶ 1
(Sept. 17, 1999) (charging genocide-related crimes, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes). Many of these early indictments focused on particular massacres. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-I, First Amended
Indictment, ¶ 1 (Apr. 11, 1997) (charging genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes); Prosecutor v. Rutaginira, Case No. ICTR 95-1C-T, Trial Chamber Judgment
and Sentence (Mar. 14, 2005) (confirming guilty plea for extermination); Prosecutor v.
Seromba. Case No. ICTR-2001-66-I, Indictment (June 8, 2001) (charging genociderelated crimes); Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR 2001-66-I, Indictment, ¶ 1 (June
8, 2001) (charging genocide-related crimes).
92. See, e.g., GAËLLE BRETON LE-GOFF, COALITION FOR WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS, ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN SEXUAL VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS IN
INDICTMENTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (ICTR) FROM
NOVEMBER 1995 TO NOVEMBER 2002 (2002), http://www.womensrightscoalition.
org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDeniedJustice/analysisoftrends_en.php
(noting that “the proportion of indictments pertaining to sexual violence fell from
100% [in] 1999-2000 to 35% in 2001-2002”); letter from Ariane Brunet, Women’s
Rights Coordinator, Rights & Democracy, on behalf of the Coalition for Women’s
Human Rights in Conflict Situations et al., to Hussan Jallow, Prosecutor, ICTR (Feb. 8,
2005),
http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDen
iedJustice/lettertoJallow_en.php (indicating that the OTP failed to bring rape charges in
70% of the cases in which judgments were delivered). By way of contrast, the former
Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone integrated charges of sexual
violence into virtually all indictments. In addition, he successfully charged individuals
with forced marriage, which is not specifically enumerated in the Statute of the Special
Court. See Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A,
Judgment, at ¶¶ 175-203 (Feb. 22, 2008).
93. See Prosecutor v. Bizimungu et al., Case No. ICTR 2000-56-I, Amended
Indictment (Joinder), ¶ 110 (Aug. 23, 2004) (accusing defendants of crimes against
humanity for organizing widespread and systemic rape, among other atrocities). See
also Prosecutor v. Kabiligi & Ntabakuze, Case Nos. ICTR 97-34-I & ICTR 97-30-I,
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 29, 66 (Oct. 8, 1999)
(adding a count of rape as a crime against humanity on motion by Del Ponte).
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were instances in which the sexual violence counts were weak or poorly
pled,94 resulting in their dismissal. In Semanza, for example, the
Prosecutor indicted the defendant for rape as an act of genocide, a crime
against humanity, and a war crime.95 The ICTR dismissed most of the rape
allegations as impermissibly vague.96 At trial, the Prosecution did not
provide evidence with respect to other rapes and sexual assaults alleged,
resulting in the rejection of those charges.97 The rape of one woman did
result in a conviction for instigating a crime against humanity.98
Although they have yet to be tested, provisions in the ICC Statute appear
to provide for an expanded role for the Court in having an impact on which
charges are brought against particular defendants.99 Most notably, upon
confirming the charges against an accused pursuant to Article 61 of the
Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber can request that the prosecutor conduct
further investigation with respect to a particular charge or to “amend a
charge because the evidence submitted appears to establish a different
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”100 In addition, decisions by the
prosecution to decline to initiate either an investigation or prosecution are
subject to some oversight by the Pre-Trial Chamber.101
In such
94. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, Case No. ICTR 98-40-I, Indictment, ¶ 6.26
(Sept. 26, 1998) (setting forth relatively pro forma sexual violence charges, not
elaborated upon in substantive counts); see also Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga, Case No.
ICTR 98-40-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw the Indictment, ¶ 1
(Mar. 18, 1999) (emphasizing that this indictment was later withdrawn after all but a
few counts dealing with attacks on Belgian soldiers and Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the
former Rwandan Prime Minister who was killed and then apparently sexually
assaulted, were dismissed at the time of confirmation). Belgium intervened in the
proceedings and later convicted the accused of the murder of the peacekeepers. The
murders of the peacekeepers and the Prime Minister also served as the subject of the
Military I proceedings against Col. Théoneste Bagosora and his co-defendants.
Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Trial Chamber Judgment &
Sentence, ¶ 576 (Dec. 18, 2008). The ICTR convicted all but Gratien Kabiligi, whose
alibi defense led to his acquittal. Id. ¶¶ 1969-1986.
95. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-I, Third Amended Indictment,
¶ 1 (Oct. 12, 1999).
96. See Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Trial Chamber Judgment
& Sentence, ¶¶ 51-52 (May 15, 2003) (noting that the broad allegations left the
impression that the prosecutor had not obtained any particular information or
evidence).
97. Id. ¶¶ 250-251.
98. See id. ¶¶ 475-479, 480-485, 506, 542-545, 547-548 (stating that the Appeals
Chamber ruled that the Trial Chamber erred by not also entering a conviction for war
crimes (outrages upon personal dignity) for this rape in light of the fact that the
elements of crimes against humanity and war crimes are materially different);
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 369,
390-395 (May 25, 2005) (emphasizing that the Appeals Chamber also found that the
Trial Chamber did not exceed its discretion in sentencing the defendant to only seven
years imprisonment for the rape).
99. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 4.
100. Id. art. 61(7)(c).
101. See id. art. 53(3)(a) (stating that in the case of a referral from the Security
Council or a State Party, the Pre-Trial Chamber can “request the Prosecutor to
reconsider [his or her] decision” not to proceed if so requested by the source of the
referral); id. art. 53(3)(b) (adding that a decision by the Prosecutor not to proceed with
an investigation or prosecution on the basis of the “interests of justice” is “effective
only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber”).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2009

21

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 4

circumstances, there may be enhanced opportunities for victims as well as
segments of civil society to intervene and petition the Court to encourage
the prosecutor to include charges of gender violence.102
1. Gravity
Several of the international criminal law tribunals are specifically
charged in their constitutive documents with concentrating on the most
serious crimes of international concern103 or upon high level defendants
102. The Lubanga case is not encouraging in this regard, however. Advocates for
gender justice decried the limited nature of the indictment against the accused in the
face of evidence of widespread sexual violence committed by his subordinates. See
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Request Submitted Pursuant to
Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for Leave to Participate as Amicus
Curiae in the Article 61 Confirmation Proceedings, ¶¶ 4-21 (Sept. 7, 2006) (attempt by
the Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice to intervene as an amicus at the time the
indictment against Lubanga was confirmed, pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rome Statute, to
encourage the prosecution to include charges of sexual violence—rape and sexual
assault, forced marriage, enslavement, and enforced pregnancy); Prosecutor v.
Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/01-01/06, Decision on Request Pursuant to Rule 103(1) of
the Statute of the ICC, 3 (Sept. 26, 2006) (denying the right of intervention under Rule
103, on the ground that the request for additional gender charges “ha[d] no link with
the present case”). At first, the ICC prosecutor indicated that he would keep the
investigation against Lubanga open. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, A Word from the
Prosecutor, supra note 61, at 2 (noting that the indictment for using child soldiers did
not “exclude the continuation of investigations into other crimes allegedly committed
by Mr. Lubanga Dyilo after the current proceedings are closed”); Luis MorenoOcampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Address at Third Session of the Assembly of
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Sept. 6, 2004),
available at http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=asp3 (announcing that he would temporarily
suspend further investigations until the present charges were tried and also stating that
a focused prosecutorial strategy means “centering our efforts on perpetrators bearing
the greatest responsibility, with a policy of short investigations, targeted indictments
and expeditious trials”). In addition, Radhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Special
Representative on Children and Armed Conflict, presented an amicus curiae brief
asking the Court to include consideration of sexual violence suffered by girls abducted
into militia. See United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on
Children and Armed Conflict, Written Submissions of the United Nations Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict; Submitted in
Application of Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶¶ 18-26, delivered to
the International Criminal Court, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06
(Mar. 17, 2003) (raising concerns that such charges will never be brought if not brought
initially, and noting that even the most narrow conception of “case” or “link” might
have supported the intervention of this NGO and the proposed amendment given the
fact that many girls and young women were abducted for the purpose of serving as
child soldiers and were subjected to gender violence at the hands of rebels under
Lubanga’s command and control); see also Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Decision on Request Pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Statute of the ICC (arguing that the
Pre-Trial Chamber could have interpreted “case” more broadly to refer not to the
existing charged crimes, but to any relevant charges that could be brought against the
accused in relation to his conduct in the particular situation); Pritchett, supra note 62
(discussing gender violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Lubanga
proceedings, and the failed efforts to expand the charges).
103. See ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 (noting the ICTR, for example, is
dedicated to prosecuting “persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda”); see also ICTY Statute, supra
note 1, art. 1 (containing similar language to the ICTR Statute); ICTR Statute, supra
note 1, art. 4 (empowering the Tribunal to prosecute “persons committing or ordering
to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949”); Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 5(1) (stating that the “jurisdiction of
the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole”). Admissibility under the Rome Statute also invokes the
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who are most responsible for the commission of international crimes.104
Where gravity is a decisive factor in choosing which charges to bring,
prosecuting gender violence may be subordinated to other prosecutorial
priorities if gender violence is not considered to be equal in severity and
gravity to other war crimes,105 such as the deliberate targeting of civilians
or the torture of prisoners of war, or to other crimes against humanity, such
as extermination or persecution—all crimes that happen to both men and
women.
This seems to have been the case before the ICTR. Indeed, early on,
there were indications that the ICTR prosecutors did not consider acts of
gender violence to be “as serious” as other acts of physical violence
perpetrated against members of the Tutsi group during the genocide.106 In
addition, it is not clear that prosecutors fully understood how rape was an
integral part of the genocide in Rwanda. Even after the Akayesu case
established that rape can serve as a predicate act of genocide,107 only a
concept of gravity and provides that a case will be considered inadmissible if it “is not
of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.” Id. art. 17(1)(d) (clarifying
that the prosecutor’s decisions first to initiate an investigation and then to initiate a
prosecution are premised on the case’s presumed admissibility which includes a
consideration of gravity). Even further, the Rome Statute also states that the prosecutor
may decline to initiate either an investigation or prosecution where there are
“substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of
justice,” taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims.
Id. art. 53(1)(c). On the basis of these provisions and prevailing interpretations thereof,
gravity concerns are thus relevant before the ICC at two key moments: in the
identification of potential situations to investigate and in the choice of particular cases
(i.e., crimes or individuals) to investigate and prosecute. See generally id.
104. See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with Inclusion
of Amendments as Promulgated on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006) art. 1,
available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KR_Law_as_amended_27_
Oct_2004_Eng.pdf [hereinafter Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers]
(stating that the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia are to “bring to
trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for
the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian
law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were
committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979”).
105. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8, ¶ 1. In addition to the required nexus
element, the ICC’s war crimes provision contains soft threshold language indicating
that “[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such
crimes.” This language emerged as a compromise between delegations that wanted
more binding language specifically limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to such situations
and delegations that did not want any threshold specific to war crimes.
Notwithstanding its non-binding nature, such language will inevitably influence
prosecutorial discretion and may prevent the prosecution of sporadic acts of gender
violence that cannot be shown to be the result of a plan or policy to commit war crimes.
Definitions of particular international crimes also contain gravity thresholds. See, e.g.,
id. art. 6, ¶ 1(b) (setting forth the genocide actus reus of “causing serious bodily or
mental harm” to members of a protected group); id. art. 7, ¶ 1(e) (including as a crime
against humanity “severe deprivation of physical liberty”); id. art. 7, ¶ 1(g) (containing
a similar provision with respect to “other form[s] of sexual violence of comparable
gravity” to rape, sexual slavery, etc.).
106. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 94 (“There is a widespread
perception among the Tribunal investigators that rape is somehow a ‘lesser’ or
‘incidental’ crime not worth investigating.”). See also supra note 55.
107. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶ 731 (Sept. 2, 1998) (finding that rape and sexual violence constituted the infliction of
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handful of subsequent defendants have been prosecuted108 for and
convicted of genocidal rape,109 and few cases feature crimes of sexual
violence at all.110 To date, the ICTR has not featured any prosecutions that
focus particularly on gender-based crimes as was seen before the ICTY.111
serious bodily and mental harm on the victims and specifically that “[t]hese rapes
resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and
their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction,
specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and
to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole.”).
108. Muhimana, for one, was charged with crimes against humanity, but not
genocide, for allegedly committing multiple acts of rape and for assisting others in the
commission of rape and other forms of sexual assault. Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case
No. ICTR 95-1B-I, Revised Amended Indictment, ¶¶ 4-7 (Feb. 3, 2004). The ICTY
has even fewer genocidal rape indictments. The current indictments against Radovan
Karadžić and Ratko Mladić before the ICTY plead sexual violence as a predicate act of
genocide. See Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18, Amended Indictment, ¶ 17
(Apr. 28, 2000). The original indictments against both men had specifically mentioned
the rape of women in the recitation of genocidal crimes. See Prosecutor v. Karadžić &
Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Indictment, ¶ 19 (May 24, 1995).
109. See Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, Trial Chamber Judgment
and Sentence, ¶ 933 (Jan. 27, 2000) (resulting in a conviction for rape as genocide and
as a crime against humanity before the same Trial Chamber that heard the Akayesu case
on the basis of a similarly amended indictment). In Musema, the Trial Chamber found
that
acts of serious bodily and mental harm, including rape and other forms of
sexual violence were often accompanied by humiliating utterances, which
clearly indicated that the intention underlying each specific act was to destroy
the Tutsi group as a whole. The Chamber noted, for example, that during the
rape of Nyiramusugi, Musema declared: “The pride of the Tutsis will end
today.” In this context, the acts of rape and sexual violence were an integral
part of the plan conceived to destroy the Tutsi group. Such acts targeted Tutsi
women, in particular, and specifically contributed to their destruction and
therefore that of the Tutsi group as such. Witness N testified before the
Chamber that Nyiramusugi, who was left for dead by those who raped her, had
indeed been killed in a way. Indeed, the Witness specified that ‘what they did
to her is worse than death.’
Id. On appeal, new evidence emerged that controverted the key testimony presented at
trial. The Appeals Chamber ruled that a miscarriage of justice had occurred and
quashed the rape as genocide conviction. See Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR
96-13-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 172-194 (Nov. 6, 2001). See also Prosecutor
v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 321-333 (June
17, 2004) (convicting defendant of genocidal rape); Wood, supra note 11, at 303-04
(discussing the lack of charges in subsequent cases despite the Akayesu precedent).
110. Several indictments involving at large defendants do contain sexual violence
allegations. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bizimana et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-I,
Prosecutor’s Amended Indictment Pursuant to the Decision of Trial Chamber II on the
Defence Motion, Pursuant to Rule 72 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Pertaining to, Inter Alia, Lack of Jurisdiction and Defect in the Form of the Indictment,
¶¶ 72-107 (Nov. 21, 2001) (charging sexual violence as genocide and crimes against
humanity).
111. Justice Richard Goldstone, the inaugural ICTY/ICTR prosecutor, issued from
the ICTY the first international indictment focused exclusively on sexual violence
committed in the town of Foča. Defendants were convicted of rape and sexual slavery
as crimes against humanity. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 &
23/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 4-11 (Feb. 22, 2001). Likewise, Prosecutor v.
Furundžija exclusively featured sexual violence charges. After an eleven day trial—
the Tribunal’s shortest—the defendant was convicted of rape as a form of torture, a
conviction upheld on appeal despite an unsuccessful challenge to the Judge’s
impartiality. Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 199-200 (July 21, 2000). On the impartiality argument, the Trial Chamber noted:
[E]ven if it were established that Judge [Florence] Mumba expressly shared the
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Gendered perceptions of the relative gravity of crimes may ultimately
influence proceedings before the ICC as well. At several points within the
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), gravity operates as an
express limitation on the Court’s jurisdiction and as a guide to the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion.112 And yet, the Court’s Statute and Elements of
Crimes provide little in the way of concrete guidance about the quantitative
or qualitative contours of this key concept.113 In his published criteria for
the selection of cases and situations,114 the ICC Prosecutor has indicated
that in assessing gravity, he will focus in part on the number of victims
with reference to the scale of the crimes and the degree of systematicity in
their commission.115 At the same time, he indicated that other more
qualitative factors would also be relevant, such as whether the crimes are
planned, cause “social alarm,” are ongoing or may be repeated, exhibit
particular cruelty or reflect other aggravating circumstances, target
especially vulnerable victims, are discriminatory in their execution, or
involve an abuse of power.116 In addition, the prosecutor announced that he
will consider “the broader impact of the crimes on the community and on
regional peace and security, including longer term social, economic, and
environmental damage.”117 By way of example, he noted that the situations
currently under consideration in Central and East Africa involved
thousands of displacements, killings, abductions, and large-scale sexual
violence.118

Id.

goals and objectives of the U.N. [Commission on the Status of Women] and
the Platform for Action, in promoting and protecting the human rights of
women, that inclination, being of a general nature, is distinguishable from an
inclination to implement those goals and objectives as a Judge in a particular
case. It follows that she could still sit on a case and impartially decide upon
issues affecting women.

112. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7, ¶ (g).
113. For a comprehensive discussion of the way in which the concept of gravity

undergirds the legal, moral, and sociological legitimacy of the International Criminal
Court, see Margaret M. DeGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International
Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the author).
114. See ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION: CRITERIA FOR
SELECTION OF SITUATIONS AND CASES 4-5 (2006) [hereinafter DRAFT CRITERIA FOR
SELECTION].
115. See OTP, THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 90, at 5 (2006) (summarizing
factors for determining whether the situation is of sufficient gravity).
116. Id.; see also DRAFT CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, supra note 114.
117. DRAFT CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, supra note 114; Letter from Sidiki Kaba,
President, International Federation for Human Rights, to Luis Moreno Ocampo,
Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (Sept. 15, 2006), available at http://www.fidh.
org/IMG/pdf/FIDH_comments_-_selection_criteria_-_final.pdf (approving of the
ICC’s approach, particularly its consideration of “the impact of the crimes on the
affected communities as well as on regional peace and security”).
118. DRAFT CRITERIA FOR SELECTION, supra note 114; see also Interactive Radio for
Justice: Interview with Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Luis Moreno
Ocampo (Apr. 5, 2006), http://www.irfj.org/Programs/Program11/IRFJ_prg11_
english.doc. Ocampo took the opportunity to publicly acknowledge the gravity of
sexual violence in a press interview:
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The ICC adjudicated these gravity provisions for the first time in the
cases arising out of the ongoing regional war being waged in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. The rulings emerged in the context of the
prosecutor’s request to the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber for the issuance of
arrest warrants against two defendants, Thomas Dyilo Lubanga and Bosco
Ntaganda, pursuant to Rule 58(1) of the ICC Statute.119 In this matter of
first impression, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that it had to confirm
the admissibility of the case prior to issuing any arrest warrant. In so doing,
the Pre-Trial Chamber looked to several factors. First, the Pre-Trial
Chamber considered the existence of systematic or large-scale crimes.120
Second, the Pre-Trial Chamber indicated that it would consider the “social
alarm” the relevant conduct caused within the international community.121
Third, the Pre-Trial Chamber indicated that it would consider the position
of the accused and whether he or she fell within the category of the most
senior leaders engaged in the situation under investigation, taking into
account the role of the suspect in the state or organization implicated in the
abuses.122 The Chamber reasoned that such an interpretation would
maximize the deterrent effect of the Court by focusing on those individuals
most capable of preventing the commission of international crimes.123

Id.

I fully agree that this is one of the gravest crimes, raping women was a tool to
destroy communities. Rape as it was perpetrated in Congo does not constitute
only sexual abuse but it is used as a weapon of war. Because women form the
basis of any community, women bring people together, and raping them is like
raping the whole community. We totally agree with you on the gravity of this
crime.

119. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 58(1) (stating that an arrest warrant is
appropriate where there “are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court” and the arrest of the person
appears necessary to guarantee his or her appearance, to ensure that the individual does
not endanger the investigation, or to prevent the person from continuing the
commission of that or other crimes).
120. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s
Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58,” ¶ 56(i) (July 13, 2006)
[hereinafter Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal].
“Systematicity” can be interpreted to mean the crimes followed a pattern, are
organized, or are being committed pursuant to a policy or plan. It seems clear that
“systemic” conduct need not be pursuant to a plan, policy, common design, or
conspiracy if it is a regular or repeated feature of an armed conflict or state of
repression that arises naturally without exogenous impetus. The notion of “large-scale”
denotes a quantitative measure and suggests that the crimes are numerous or
widespread.
121. Id. ¶ 56(i).
122. Compare id. ¶¶ 56, 60, 66 (restating that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s reasoning for
its three criteria, which, had it remained effective, would have precluded the pyramidal
prosecutorial strategy employed by many domestic prosecutors and the ICTY), with
Carla Del Ponte, Investigation and Prosecution of Large-Scale Crimes at the
International Level, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 539, 543 (2006) (noting the common
practice of building “a case against the most senior persons responsible [with] a series
of cases which ‘work up the ladder,’ prosecuting lower-level perpetrators in the
collection of evidence against the higher-level perpetrators”).
123. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal, ¶ 60.
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Although the Pre-Trial Chamber issued the arrest warrant for Lubanga,124 it
determined that Ntaganda was not a central figure in the decision-making
process of his group and lacked any authority over the development or
implementation of policies and practices (such as the negotiation of peace
agreements).125 This was notwithstanding the fact that Ntaganda was in a
command position over sector commanders and field officers.126 As such,
the Pre-Trial Chamber deemed the case against Ntaganda inadmissible, and
the arrest warrant did not issue.
The Prosecutor appealed this decision, arguing that the Pre-Trial
Chamber committed an error of law in defining gravity too narrowly for the
purpose of determining whether to issue an arrest warrant against
Ntaganda.127 The Appeals Chamber ruled128 as a preliminary matter that an
admissibility determination was not a pre-requisite to the issuance of an
arrest warrant.129 Turning to the issue of gravity, the Appeals Chamber
determined that the Pre-Trial Chamber had erred in its interpretation of
gravity in several key respects. First, it noted that imposing requirements
of systematicity or large-scale action contradicted the guiding threshold
language of Article 8(1) governing war crimes—which provides for
jurisdiction only “in particular” when war crimes are committed “as part of
a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes”—
and duplicated aspects of the definition of crimes against humanity,
requiring a showing that the charged acts were part of a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population.130 The Appeals Chamber
also took issue with the concept of “social alarm,” which it noted depends
on “subjective and contingent reactions” to crimes “rather than upon their
objective gravity.”131
124. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest (Feb. 10,
2006). At the time the warrant was issued, Lubanga had been in the custody of
Congolese authorities, who transferred him to the ICC on March 17, 2006, making him
the first defendant in the custody of the ICC. His trial commenced in January 2009.
125. See Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal, ¶¶ 8,
91, 92 (remanding back to the Pre-Trial Chamber the decision on whether to issue an
arrest warrant because the Pre-Trial Chamber curtailed its inquiry into Ntaganda,
believing the case was inadmissible).
126. See id. ¶¶ 75-76 (opining that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s announcement that
perpetrators other than those at the very top are excluded from the exercise of the
jurisdiction of the ICC placed too much emphasis on formalistic grounds).
127. Id. ¶ 36.
128. See id. This decision, which is dated 2006, appears to have been reclassified as
public in April 2008 when the arrest warrant against Ntaganda was unsealed. See
Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision to Unseal the Warrant of
Arrest Against Bosco Ntaganda (April 28, 2008).
129. See Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal,
¶¶ 41-42 (ruling that Article 58 contains an exhaustive list of factors to consider in
issuing a warrant for arrest such that admissibility should not be treated as an additional
substantive pre-requisite); id. ¶ 50 (noting that admissibility determinations should
involve the accused, which is impossible where they are undertaken in advance of the
issuance of an arrest warrant).
130. Id. ¶¶ 69-71.
131. Id. ¶ 72 (explaining that the crimes listed in the governing statute were
specially selected as the most serious crimes of international concern, and opining that
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Finally, the Appeals Chamber noted that the deterrent effect of the Court
will be maximized where all categories of perpetrators may be brought
before the Court.132 It also noted that “individuals who are not at the very
top of an organization may still carry considerable influence and commit,
or generate the widespread commission of, very serious crimes.”133 The
Court thus reversed the finding of inadmissibility and remanded the case to
the Pre-Trial Chamber to determine on the basis of Article 58(1) alone
whether an arrest warrant against Ntaganda should issue.134 The Pre-Trial
Chamber subsequently unsealed an arrest warrant against Ntaganda135
charging him alongside Lubanga with enlisting, conscripting, and using
child soldiers in armed conflict.136 In so ruling on the gravity question, the
Appeals Chamber appropriately refocused this inquiry on qualitative rather
than quantitative factors, ensured flexibility in pursuing cases, enhanced the
deterrent power of the Court, and lessened the chances that gravity
determinations will exclude cases involving sexual violence, even where
they are committed by low-level perpetrators.
2. Most Senior Defendants
Where a prosecutorial strategy focuses on those “most responsible” for
international crimes—either out of an exercise of prosecutorial discretion
or pursuant to a tribunal mandate—crimes of sexual violence may present
particular problems of proof under the applicable doctrines of derivative or
secondary liability where the senior official or authority may have been
distant from the physical commission of the crimes. Where superiors
ordered their subordinates to commit gender-based crimes, or otherwise
instigated such crimes,137 the direct liability of superiors for any crimes

subjective criteria are not necessarily appropriate in determining admissibility).
132. Id. ¶ 73 (questioning the logic of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s assertion that
deterrence would be at its zenith when high-level perpetrators are prosecuted and
alternatively proposing that deterrence is best achieved when there is no such per se
exclusion on prosecution).
133. Id. ¶ 77.
134. Id. ¶¶ 91-92.
135. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision to Unseal
the Warrant of Arrest Against Bosco Ntaganda (Apr. 28, 2008).
136. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest (Aug.
22, 2006).
137. See Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko & Ntahobali, Case No. ICTR 97-21-I,
Amended Indictment, ¶¶ 4.2, 7 (Mar. 1, 2001) (indicting Pauline Nyiramasuhuko,
Minister for the Family and for the Advancement of Woman during the genocide in
Rwanda and a leader in the Hutu-dominated National Republican Movement for
Democracy and Development Party, for genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide,
public and direct incitement to commit genocide, and various crimes against humanity,
including rape, pursuant to the doctrine of superior responsibility); see also Peter
Landesman, A Woman’s Work, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, (Magazine), at I3.
Landesman reported that Nyiramasuhuko, who was the first woman to be indicted for
rape under international law, told her subordinates to rape then kill Tutsi women who
had sought refuge in a Red Cross camp set up in a local stadium or who had been
captured. In particular, she was reported to have said “before you kill the women, you
need to rape them.” Id.
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committed is usually clear.138 By contrast, where superiors are prosecuted
according to forms of derivative or secondary liability, such as pursuant to
the doctrines of superior responsibility, linking the defendant to acts of
sexual violence may raise particular challenges.139
For example, in addition to proving that the direct perpetrator was a legal
subordinate under the “effective control” of the accused, the superior
responsibility doctrine requires a showing that the accused knew, or should
have known, that his subordinates were committing or were about to
commit international crimes.140 Difficulties in linking a high-level accused
to acts of sexual violence arose in cases before the ICTR. In Akayesu, for
example, prosecutors claimed that they knew of acts of sexual violence
perpetrated in the Taba commune where Akayesu served as bourgmeister;
however they were unable to charge Akayesu for these crimes in the
absence of evidence of a relationship of subordination between Akayesu
and the direct perpetrators and additional evidence proving that Akayesu
knew of the crimes.141 Unsolicited witness testimony during trial finally
placed Akayesu in the vicinity of where crimes of sexual violence were
committed, which led to the amendment of his indictment and his ultimate
138. See Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-T, Indictment, ¶¶ 20,
21, 24, 37-40 (June 20, 2001) (indicting Gacumbitsi, the bourgmestre of Rusumo
commune, for genocide and crimes against humanity by virtue of ordering, instigating,
permitting, or failing to prevent or punish his subordinates and others for committing
rape and other sexual assaults). But see Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR
2001-64-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 291-293, 321-333 (June 17, 2004) (convicting
the defendant of genocide and the crime against humanity of rape for instigating some
of the rapes alleged, but failing to address his superior responsibility liability);
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 126-138 (July 7, 2006) (addressing the Prosecutor’s unsuccessful appeal of acquittal
for certain rapes that were proven to have occurred but, in the Trial Chamber’s
estimation, were not sufficiently linked to the accused to result in a conviction, because
the rapes in question either occurred prior to the alleged act of instigation or could not
be causally linked to the alleged act of instigation). The Appeals Chamber ruled that
the Trial Chamber erred in not fully considering Gacumbitsi’s superior liability,
especially given potential de facto superiority over the direct perpetrators in question,
but found that the evidence did not establish the necessary relationship of
subordination. Id. ¶¶ 141-146. Over dissents by Judges Shahabudeen and Schomburg,
the Appeals Chamber also confirmed that the defendant could not be convicted of the
rapes by virtue of his participation in a joint criminal enterprise, because the
prosecution had not adequately pled this form of responsibility in the indictment or
cured any defect therein through subsequent submissions. Id. ¶¶ 158-175. See
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-A, Separate Opinion of Judge
Shahabuddeen, ¶¶ 28-39 (July 7, 2006) (arguing that the indictment properly plead JCE
liability); Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-A, Separate Opinion of
Judge Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility of the Appellant for Committing
Genocide, ¶¶ 7-8, 15 (July 7, 2006) (same).
139. See generally Patricia Viseur Sellers, Individual(s’) Liability for Collective
Sexual Violence, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 153 (Karen Knop ed., 2004)
(discussing how various doctrines of individual liability have resulted in convictions
for sexual violence before the ICTY).
140. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. S/25704,
(May 3, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/s25704.htm
(discussing superior responsibility).
141. Cf. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 49-77 (Sept. 2, 1998) (discussing the various de facto and de jure powers held by the
town bourgmeister).
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conviction for aiding and abetting sexual violence.142
Likewise, in Muvunyi, the prosecution sought to withdraw the rape
charges altogether a few weeks prior to the start of trial on the grounds that
witnesses could not be traced and others refused to testify.143 The Trial
Chamber denied the Prosecutor’s request to withdraw the rape charges on
the grounds that the Prosecution had not provided sufficient grounds upon
which to reconsider the confirmation of the original indictment and the
Defense had already expended time and resources preparing to defend the
charges.144 Although the Prosecution ultimately located and presented the
testimony of three rape victims, whose harrowing testimony was deemed
reliable by the Trial Chamber, none of the witnesses was raped by the
specific group of subordinates alleged in the indictment.145 Accordingly,
the defendant was acquitted on these counts.146 Both sides appealed, with
the prosecutor alleging error in the rape acquittals, among other things.
With respect to the rape charges, the Appeals Chamber agreed with the
Trial Chamber that the charges proven did not correspond to the allegations
in the indictment, and that variances between the evidence adduced at trial
and the allegations within the indictment remained un-remedied during the
pre-trial period.147
Because of difficulties proving superior responsibility, particularly with
respect to the rigorous “effective control” standard in situations in which
lines of command and control are blurred or ad hoc,148 prosecutors have
demonstrated a preference for cases involving direct evidence in more
recent indictments. Foregoing superior responsibility charges may insulate
leaders from sexual violence charges where subordinates committed such

142. See id.
143. See News Release, Hirondelle News Agency, Rwanda-ICTR Honeymoon

Threatens to End over Rape Charges (Feb. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/rapeVictimssDen
iedJustice/hirondelle050210_en.php (recounting the uproar caused by the Prosecutor in
Rwanda; even Rwanda’s representative to the ICTR criticized the decision); Letter
from Dr. Alex Obote-Odora, Special Assistant to the Prosecutor, ICTR, to Ariane
Bruent, Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations (Feb. 11, 2005),
available at http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/site/advocacyDossiers/rwanda/
rapeVictimssDeniedJustice/responseICTRmuvunyi.pdf (explaining and defending the
decision to withdraw sexual violence counts).
144. Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR 2000-55A-PT, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Indictment, ¶¶ 28-34
(Feb. 23, 2005).
145. See Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR 2000-55A-PT, Trial Chamber
Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 409 (Sept. 12, 2006) (stating that “[t]he chamber fully
understands the unique circumstances of rape victims and sympathizes with them,” but
that in light of the specific nature of the rape charges in the indictment, the chamber
could not find Muvyuni responsible beyond a reasonable doubt).
146. Id. ¶¶ 400-409.
147. Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR 2000-55A-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, ¶¶ 160-169 (Aug. 29, 2008).
148. See generally Beth Van Schaack, Command Responsibility: The Anatomy of
Proof in Romagoza v. Garcia, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213 (2003) (discussing the
challenges inherent in charging superior responsibility).
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crimes and it cannot be shown that leaders ordered or instigated them.149
In lieu of superior responsibility, prosecutors (particularly before the
ICTY) now regularly charge superiors with participating in a joint criminal
enterprise (JCE) 150 as a way to hold them liable for crimes committed by
others.151 This has enabled the prosecution of rape and other forms of
sexual violence that are committed by other individuals.152 The extended
form of the doctrine has the potential to be particularly useful in charging
crimes of gender and sexual violence that may not be an express purpose of
the joint criminal enterprise, but that are otherwise foreseeable under the
circumstances.153 It is not yet clear under the law whether the requirement
149. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 144-145 (July 7, 2006) (concluding that the Prosecution was
unable to show the link necessary between the accused and the specific perpetrators of
particular incidents of rape, despite the fact that the accused imposed law and order
over the entire commune and knew or had reason to know of the specific rapes).
150. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 220-229 (July 15, 1999) (affirming the cognizability of the joint criminal enterprise
doctrine). The law now recognizes three forms of joint criminal enterprise. For the
“basic” joint criminal enterprise doctrine, it is necessary to show that the accused
intended to participate in a common plan aimed at the crime’s commission and
intended the commission of the crime. The second (“systemic”) form provides for
liability for individuals who contribute to the maintenance or essential functions of a
criminal institution or system, such as a concentration or detention camp. For the
“extended” version of the doctrine, which enables the prosecution of crimes that were
not part of the original common plan, it is necessary to show that the crimes for which
the accused is being prosecuted were a “natural and foreseeable” consequence of
implementing the common plan. The defendant is held liable where he or she willingly
took the risk that these unintended crimes would be committed during the course of the
execution of the crimes for which the JCE was formed. Id. Many of the original
indictments before the ICTR did not contain allegations concerning the JCE doctrine,
because they were issued prior to Tadić. The ICTR has not allowed prosecutors to rely
on the doctrine when it is introduced at trial or in closing arguments. See Prosecutor v.
Gatete, Case No. ICTR 2000-61-I, Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for Leave to
File an Amended Indictment, ¶ 5 (Apr. 21, 2005) (allowing an amended indictment in
order to better plead the doctrine); Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki, &
Imanishimwe, Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Trial Chamber Judgment & Sentence, ¶ 34
(Feb. 25, 2004) (disallowing ICTR prosecutors from relying on the doctrine when it is
introduced at trial or in closing arguments).
151. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mpambara, Case No. ICTR 2001-65-I, Amended
Indictment, ¶ 20 (Nov. 27, 2004) (charging defendant with genocide for acts of sexual
violence either as a superior pursuant to the doctrine of superior responsibility or as a
member of a joint criminal enterprise where such acts were a foreseeable outcome of
the objectives and implementation of the JCE, in the absence of allegations that the
accused participated directly in any of the crimes); see also Prosecutor v. Mpambara,
Case No. ICTR 2001-65-A, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 28-40 (Sept. 11, 2006).
Notwithstanding allegations of direct participation, the Prosecution apparently went
forward on the basis of joint criminal enterprise and aiding and abetting by omission
theories of responsibility, at times linking the two. Id. The Trial Chamber acquitted
the defendant. Id. ¶ 175.
152. Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30-T2, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 307, 319-320 (Nov. 2, 2001) (finding that one of the purposes underlying the
detention of non-Serbs in Omarska prison camp was the perpetuation of rape and
forced impregnation); Prosecutor v. Krišjnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Chamber
Judgement, ¶¶ 965-966, 972, 1105, 1146, 1150 (Sept. 27, 2006) (noting uncharged
incidents of sexual violence that were committed pursuant to the implementation of the
accused’s JCE).
153. See Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Indictment, Rule 50 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, ¶¶ 3, 18, 37, 47 (Feb. 13, 2004) (permitting the Prosecutor to
amend the indictment on the basis of newly discovered evidence and new jurisprudence
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of foreseeability has any limiting power, or if in a situation of mass
violence or armed conflict, all international crimes are effectively
foreseeable. Certainly, in light of Security Council Resolution 1820 and
other consistent evidence of the pervasiveness of sexual violence during
situations of armed conflict, general lawlessness, and repression, it is
increasingly difficult to argue that sexual violence is not natural or
foreseeable under these circumstances.154 This is especially true in
situations in which the common plan involves the detention of women by
military or paramilitary forces.155
C. Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining is now a staple of international criminal law, despite
some initial resistance to the process from civil law practitioners.156 In
several ICTR cases, the Prosecutor dropped or withdrew sexual violence
on the applicability of the extended notion of joint criminal enterprise to crimes of
sexual violence); Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-R54, Scheduling
Order—Oral Arguments on Rape, Complicity in Genocide and the Pleading of a Joint
Criminal Enterprise in the Amended Indictment (Aug. 8, 2005) (calling for oral
argument on, among other things, whether the extended form of JCE could be pled as a
form of liability for a rape charge); Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR
1998-44-I, Amended Indictment of 24 August 2005, ¶¶ 67-70 (Aug. 24, 2005)
(charging acts of rape, in the new indictment, as the “natural and foreseeable
consequence of the object of the joint criminal enterprise to destroy the Tutsi group.”);
Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case Nos. ICTR 98-44-AR72.5 & ICTR 98-44-AR72.6,
Decision on Jurisdictional Appeals: Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶ 8 (Apr. 12, 2006)
(ruling on the defendants’ appeal of other aspects of the Trial Chamber’s JCE ruling,
but not the doctrine’s applicability to charges of rape); Prosecutor v. Karemera et al.,
Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on Motions for Judgment of Acquittal: Rule 98bis of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶ 40 (Mar. 19, 2008) (allowing the JCE counts
relating to rape to survive a trial motion for judgment of acquittal).
154. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1820, supra note 6, ¶ 3 (noting that during times of armed
conflict, women and girls are particularly targeted for sexual violence as a tactic of
war).
155. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶ 616 (Aug. 2, 2001) (ruling that acts of rape and other forms of abuse were not an
agreed upon objective of the members of the joint criminal enterprise). The ICTY held
in Krstić, however, that such acts were a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
ethnic cleansing campaign, which was the objective of the JCE, in light of the fact that
the campaign generated a highly vulnerable populace at the mercy of military and
paramilitary units. Id. ¶¶ 616-617; see also Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT98-30/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 327 (finding it inevitable that female detainees
would be sexually assaulted while in the custody of “men with weapons who were
often drunk, violent, and physically and mentally abusive and who were allowed to act
with virtual impunity”). The Kvočka Trial Chamber found that even where such abuse
was not inherent to the intended system of persecutory detention and ill treatment, it
was alternatively a natural or foreseeable consequence of the system. Id. ¶¶ 325-327.
See generally Kelly Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related
Crimes Under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles,
21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 288 (2003).
156. The ICTR secured an important guilty plea from Jean Kambanda, the former
Prime Minister of Rwanda. Kambanda pled guilty to all six counts in the indictment,
none of which concerned gender-based violence. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case
No. ICTR 97-23-DP, Indictment (Oct. 16, 1997) (indicting defendant for genocide and
crimes against humanity, but no gender-based crimes). It is unclear if he was ever
asked to plea to the acts of sexual violence in Rwanda. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda,
Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S (Sept. 4, 1998) (recounting
substance of plea).
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counts where the defendant pled guilty on other counts. For example, the
prosecution had charged Omar Serushago with various acts of rape as the
predicate acts of genocide and as crimes against humanity.157 The
defendant subsequently pled guilty to four out of five counts, excluding the
rape as a crime against humanity count. The prosecutor subsequently
withdrew the rape charge.158 Although rape had been charged as a
predicate of genocide, none of the facts to which Serushago admitted
related to the rape allegations.159 Indeed, several cases manifested the same
pattern in which defendants plead guilty to murder and extermination, but
refuse to accept responsibility for sexual violence charges.160
D. Failing to Make Testimony of Victims Trial Ready
Even where cases are investigated and charges are brought, shoddy
prosecutorial preparation and ill-prepared testimony can result in acquittals.
At one point, more than half of the ICTR indictments included charges of
rape and other forms of sexual violence (many involving counts added by
amendment).161 Many cases, however, ended in acquittal on the rape and
sexual violence counts. For example, in Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, the
defendant was acquitted of rape (charged as a crime against humanity)
because two of the judges found that the key witness lacked credibility due
to inconsistencies in her testimony at trial and prior statements to
investigators.162 The Trial Chamber thus acquitted the defendant of rapes
157. See Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR 98-39-I, Modified Indictment,
¶¶ 4.22, 5.11-12, 5.25-27 (Oct. 8, 1998) (indicting Serushago for crimes committed by
him personally, by persons he supervised, or by his confederates, with his knowledge
and consent, including rape and sexual assault of Tutsi women and girls).
158. Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. 98-39-S, Trial Chamber Sentence, ¶ 4
(Feb. 5, 1999).
159. Id. ¶ 25; see also Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR 98-39-A, Reasons
for Judgment, ¶¶ 1, 34 (Apr. 6, 2000) (affirming the Trial Chamber’s sentence of
fifteen years imprisonment).
160. See Prosecutor v. Nzabirinda, Case No. ICTR 2001-77-T, Trial Chamber
Sentencing Judgment (Feb. 23, 2007). The original December 2001 indictment against
Nzabirinda contained charges, among others, of rape as a crime against humanity. On
November 20, 2006, the prosecutor requested the withdrawal of the majority of the
counts, with prejudice, and submitted an amended indictment that contained only one
count of murder as a crime against humanity. Several weeks later, the defendant pled
guilty to the single count. Id. ¶¶ 7, 41. The prosecutor apparently explained the
withdrawal on the ground that “the evidence is not there.” Id. ¶ 44; see also Prosecutor
v. Rugambarara, Case No. ICTR 2000-59-I, Decision on the Prosecution Motion to
Amend the Indictment, ¶ 2 (June 28, 2007) (noting abandonment of genocide and other
crimes against humanity charges (including torture and rape) in favor of a single count
of extermination as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v. Bisengimana, Case No.
ICTR 00-60-T, Trial Chamber Judgment & Sentence, ¶¶ 7, 12 (Apr. 13, 2006) (noting
that prosecution withdrew rape and other charges contained in the original indictment
dated July 1, 2000). In October 2005, defendant pled guilty to remaining counts of
murder and extermination. Id.
161. See Sita Balthazar, Gender Crimes and the International Criminal Tribunals,
10 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 43, 43 (2006).
162. Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-T, Trial Chamber Judgment &
Sentence, ¶ 924 (Dec. 1, 2003) (acquitting the accused of individual responsibility for
various rape charges either because he was not present at the incident, did not
specifically order his subordinates to rape, and neither knew nor could have known that
rapes were being committed by the Interahamwe).
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that were proven to have occurred.163 In a strong dissent, Judge Arlette
Ramaroson argued that the inconsistencies were not due to a lack of
credibility but to an incompetent investigation.164 Later, the Prosecution
missed a deadline to appeal the acquittal. Its untimely motion to allow the
appeal was rejected by the Appeals Chamber for lack of good cause.165

163. Id. ¶¶ 917-925 (recounting three instances of rape, including one of a young,
handicapped Tutsi, for which the accused was found not guilty).
164. See Prosecutor v. Kajeljeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-T, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Arlette Ramaroson, ¶¶ 26-28, 36 (dissenting from the Trial Chamber judgment
and proposing that witness GDO’s trial testimony should have been considered rather
than her written statements given earlier to ICTR investigators, especially in light of the
fact that she was illiterate; incapable of estimating in meters; and the rape took place in
a forest where visibility and hearing were difficult).
165. Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-A, Decision on Prosecution
Urgent Motion for Acceptance of Prosecution Notice of Appeal Out of Time
(Jan. 23, 2004).
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Other acquittals for rape occurred in the cases against Niyitegeka,166
Muvunyi,167 and Kamuhanda,168 primarily because the prosecutor failed to
meet the required burden of proof. The prosecution did not appeal many of
these acquittals. In other cases, such as with respect to defendant
Ndindabahizi,169 the prosecution withdrew sexual violence counts in
advance of trial where supporting evidence was determined to be
unavailable or unavailing. Likewise, in Mpambara, the prosecution
conceded that it had offered no evidence in relation to the rape allegations
in the indictment, so the ICTR ruled that the defendant had no case to
answer with respect to those allegations.170
Consistent with their age, health, experience with the legal process, and
so on, victims and witnesses must be properly prepared to give their
testimony. At all times, investigators, prosecutors, and other personnel
must be trained to handle witnesses with respect and sensitivity.171
Preparing witnesses to testify in advance of trial has been expressly
condoned by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR. In Karemera, one of the
defendants sought an order from the Trial Chamber preventing the
Prosecution from “proofing” its witnesses prior to their giving testimony.172
Rejecting the motion, the Trial Chamber sanctioned the practice under the
following conditions:
Provided that it does not amount to the manipulation of a witness’
evidence, this practice may encompass preparing and familiarizing a
166. Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR 96-14-T, Trial Chamber Judgment &
Sentence, ¶¶ 301, 455-458 (May 16, 2003) (acquitting defendant of rape charges (pled
as a crime against humanity) for insufficient evidence with respect to one victim and
where the prosecution brought no other evidence that the accused “did cause women to
be raped,” as alleged in the indictment). The defendant was, however, convicted of the
commission of “other inhumane acts” for ordering Interahamwe members to undress a
dead woman and insert a piece of wood into her vagina. Id. ¶¶ 7.2, 316, 463-467. He
was also present when his co-attackers killed and castrated a prominent Tutsi. Id.
¶¶ 463-467; see also Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR 96-14-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 46 (July 9, 2004) (denying an appeal of rape charges).
167. See supra text accompanying note 146.
168. See Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR 95-54A-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment (Jan. 22, 2004) (acquitting the defendant and his co-attackers of rape because
although witnesses heard that at least one of twenty abducted girls had been raped,
there was no direct evidence to this effect). In Kamuhanda, the rape charges survived a
motion for acquittal, but the defendant was ultimately acquitted because all of the
evidence in the record of his involvement in rape constituted hearsay. The prosecutor
did not appeal. See Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment (Sept. 19, 2005) (setting forth defendant’s grounds of appeal).
169. Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR 2001-71-I, Trial Chamber
Judgment (July 15, 2004). In October 2001, the judge who confirmed the original
indictment granted leave to the Prosecution to amend the charges to allege the
commission of rape as a crime against humanity. Id. ¶ 9. In June 2003, however, the
Trial Chamber granted leave to withdraw the rape counts. Id. ¶ 13.
170. Prosecutor v. Mpambara, Case No. ICTR 2001-65-T, Decision on the
Defence’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, ¶ 7 (Oct. 21, 2005).
171. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13 (noting that rape victims may be uncomfortable
with or unprepared to answer detailed questions about what was done to them
physically).
172. Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73.8, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing, ¶ 3 (May 11, 2007).
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witness with the proceedings before the Tribunal, comparing prior
statements made by a witness, detecting differences and inconsistencies
in recollection of the witness, allowing a witness to refresh his or her
memory in respect of the evidence he or she will give, and inquiring and
disclosing to the Defence additional information and/or evidence of
incriminatory or exculpatory nature in sufficient time prior to the
173
witness’ testimony.

The Appeals Chamber affirmed,174 noting that in the absence of an
express rule on point, Rule 89(B) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence generally confers discretion on the Trial Chamber to apply “rules
of evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before
it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles
of law.”175 Indeed, a survey of national law revealed wide variations in
witness preparation practices, suggesting the absence of a general principle
of law and no consensus that the practice is inherently unethical or
prejudicial to the accused.176 The Appeals Chamber noted that the
defendant is free to explore issues of witness coaching or manipulation on
cross-examination.177
A Trial Chamber of the ICC has taken the opposite approach,178 raising
concerns with respect to witness preparation in general and with the
prosecution of gender crimes in particular. In the Lubanga case, the PreTrial Chamber specifically prohibited the Prosecution from proofing its
witnesses on the ground that the Prosecution had failed to show that the
practice of witness proofing is a widely accepted practice in international
criminal law, which would enable it to be considered part of the applicable
law of the Court pursuant to Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute.179 The
173. Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on Defence
Motions to Prohibit Witness Proofing, Rule 73 of the Rules and Procedure of Evidence,
¶ 15 (Dec. 15, 2006).
174. See Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73.8, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing, ¶¶ 14-15; see also Prosecutor v. Limaj et al.,
Decision on Defence Motion on Prosecution Practice of “Proofing” Witnesses, Case
No. IT-03-66-T (Dec. 10, 2004) (upholding the practice of witness proofing before the
ICTY); Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL 04-15-T, Decision on the Gbao and
Sesay Joint Application for the Exclusion of the Testimony of Witness TF1-141, ¶ 33
(Oct. 26, 2005) (finding that “proofing witnesses prior to their testimony in court is a
legitimate practice that serves the interests of justice . . . especially so given the
particular circumstances of many of the witnesses in this trial who are testifying about
traumatic events in an environment that can be entirely foreign and intimidating for
them”).
175. Karamera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR73.8, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing, ¶ 8.
176. See id. ¶ 11 (noting further that witness proofing is not incompatible with the
Tribunal’s Statute and Rules).
177. Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
178. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Practices
of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, ¶ 42 (Nov. 8, 2006) (stating that if
any general principle of law could be drawn from a survey of the national laws of the
world’s various legal systems, witness proofing would be prohibited).
179. Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 21(1) (summarizing the applicable laws
that the Court may apply, ranging from the Rome Statute itself to the general principles
of law derived by national courts).
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Trial Chamber adopted an inquisitorial perspective and reasoned that
witnesses “belong” to neither the Prosecution nor the Defense, but rather
are witnesses of the Court.180 The Trial Chamber affirmed the decision on
reconsideration, noting that the ICC’s procedures differ markedly in a
number of ways from the procedural regimes of the ad hoc tribunals.181 It
determined that while it may be appropriate for a witness to review his or
her prior statements, there should be no discussion of the topics to be dealt
with in court that might result in a “rehearsal” of trial testimony.182 As it
now stands before the ICC, the general familiarization with the courtroom
and its proceedings are to be conducted by the Registry rather than either
party.183
The ICTR approach seems the better one in the context of international
criminal law, where trials may happen years from the events in question,
rely heavily on oral testimony, and involve traumatized witnesses with little
experience with legal institutions or processes. Allowing both parties to
meet with witnesses in advance of their testimony can enable witnesses to
refresh their recollections of events; review any prior statements; fully
identify relevant facts (including exculpatory evidence); work on
presenting their evidence in a more complete, orderly, and structured
manner; and prepare for cross-examination.184 Having witnesses take the
stand “cold” threatens to render them unprepared to testify effectively
before the Court. It may also re-traumatize victim witnesses during crossexamination or discredit them where their testimony is stilted or confused
or diverges from statements that may have been taken years prior.185
The witness proofing ruling may also disparately impact women and
particularly victims of sexual violence. Such victims may find it difficult
to testify about what happened to them without the benefit of some prior
preparation so they are not surprised or insulted by sensitive or seemingly
invasive questions. Without the benefit of witness proofing, it will be
crucial for the ICC judges to manage the trial process to insure that
witnesses are not cross-examined so aggressively, by either side, that they
are re-traumatized. Allowing ill-prepared witnesses to undergo this
treatment would undermine the rehabilitative potential of participating in a
180. See Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Practices of Witness
Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, ¶ 26.
181. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Regarding the
Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial,
¶ 45 (Nov. 30, 2007) (opining that the procedural framework of the Rome Statute is
independent from the ad hoc procedures in preparing witnesses for trial).
182. Id. ¶ 51.
183. Id. ¶ 22.
184. Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on Defence
Motions to Prohibit Witness Proofing: Rule 73 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
¶ 15 (Dec. 15, 2006).
185. See generally B. Don Taylor, Witness Proofing in International Criminal Law:
Is Widening Procedural Divergence in International Criminal Tribunals a Cause for
Concern? (2008), http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2008/Taylor.pdf (questioning the
desirability of the “widening procedural divergence” between the ad hoc tribunals and
the ICC).
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justice process.
E. Safeguarding the Rights and Safety of Victims and Witnesses
In addition to all the logistical impediments to investigating and proving
gender crimes, the prosecutor must be able to ensure the effective
participation and safety of victims and witnesses. There are a whole host
of procedural protections and mechanisms that courts and prosecutors can
utilize to ensure that victims are not alienated, re-traumatized, or
endangered by their participation in trial,186 including rape shield laws,187
opportunities to testify anonymously or confidentially (e.g., through face
and voice distortion), written statements in lieu of oral testimony,188
pursuing the in camera presentation of evidence, the taking of evidence by
electronic means (such as closed-circuit television), expunging identifying
information from public materials, witness relocation programs, etc.189 It
should not be necessary for a victim or witness to demonstrate an imminent
threat before these mechanisms are used. Prior to giving their testimony,
victims must fully understand what the testimonial process will entail, what
protective measures are available to them, and what limitations on such
measures exist so that they can make an informed decision about
participating. In implementing these measures, the prosecutor must
continually coordinate with the Victims and Witnesses Unit of the
particular tribunal (which is often housed in the Registry) to ensure their
effectiveness. Ideally, the prosecutor would also offer victims and
186. See generally ANNE-MARIE L.M. DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE ICC AND THE PRACTICE OF THE ICTY AND
THE ICTR 231-82 (2005) (detailing the rationale and the form of ICC protective
measures available to safeguard victims who appear as witnesses).
187. See RULES AND PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, R. 96, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.1 (as amended Mar. 14, 2008)
[hereinafter ICTR Rules] (containing a rape shield provision that provides that no
witness corroboration is required in the face of testimony about sexual violence,
consent is not a defense except in limited circumstances, and no evidence of prior
sexual conduct of the victims may be introduced); see also RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, R. 70, 71, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9,
2002) (embodying similar rape shield provisions applicable to the ICC).
188. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Decision on
Reconsideration of Admission of Written Statements in Lieu of Oral Testimony and
Admission of the Testimony of Prosecution Witness Gay, ¶ 13 (Sept. 28, 2007)
(allowing certain written statements regarding sexual violence to be admitted into
evidence). But see Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR 1998-44-T, Decision
on Prosecution Motion for Admission of Evidence of Rape and Sexual Assault
Pursuant to Rule 92 bis of the Rules; and Order for Reduction of Prosecution Witness
List, ¶ 20 (Dec. 11, 2006) (ruling that evidence of witnesses of rape must be submitted
orally, because the allegations were “so pivotal to the Prosecution’s case that it would
be unfair to the Accused to permit the evidence to be given in written form without an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses”).
189. See, ICTR Rules, supra note 187, R. 69(A) (allowing a judge to order the nondisclosure of a witness’s identity to the defendant in pre-trial proceedings); id.
R. 75(A)-(B) (allowing for a number of measures to ensure a witness’s privacy and
protection, such as in camera proceedings, so long as “the measures are consistent with
the rights of the accused”); see also Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 68(1) (recognizing
similar concerns for the “safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity, and
privacy of victims and witnesses”).
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witnesses referrals to health services and psychological counseling prior,
during, and after testifying, if necessary.190
Although these procedural protections are available in the ICTR, they
have not been fully used in all cases. The identities of protected witnesses
have been publically revealed and witnesses have been harassed and
threatened after returning to Rwanda following their testimony.191 One
report indicated that the overwhelming sentiments expressed by rape
survivors in Rwanda about their experience with the ICTR were “burning
anger, deep frustration, dashed hopes, indignation and even resignation.”192
Research with rape victims reveals that participation in ICTR proceedings
has had the effect of exacerbating, rather than relieving victims’
suffering.193
In their interactions with victims and witnesses, prosecutors need not act
alone. In addition to the Victims and Witness Unit of the tribunal,
prosecutors can connect with civil society organizations in situ that are
dedicated to supporting victims of gender crimes and to promoting gender
justice.194 These groups can help surface instances of gender violence,
empower victims to come forward, and facilitate investigations.195 Such
groups can act as liaisons or conduits between the prosecution and victims
and also help to provide the necessary financial, logistical, psychological,
and social support for victims undertaking the difficult process of testifying
against perpetrators.196 Once legal proceedings are concluded, these groups
can facilitate the reintegration of victims into society. Notwithstanding the
value of such relationships, external relations emerge as a perennial
weakness in the international justice system, in which the tribunal staff are
over-extended and outreach is considered a dispensable luxury.197 Indeed,
in what has been described as a “witness crisis,”198 several victims’ groups
190. See Wood, supra note 11, at 322-23.
191. See Jefferson, supra note 19 (noting that the threats and harassment extend to

the families of the victims as well and that improved mechanisms for protection are
crucial to encourage the victims to testify at trial).
192. NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 4.
193. See id. (explaining that the Rwandan rape victims desire an environment in the
ICTR that treats them with the utmost respect and care at all stages of the legal process
and allows for a public record of the crimes of sexual violence committed against
them).
194. See David Backer, Civil Society and Transitional Justice, 2 HUM. RTS. J. 297,
300-02 (2003) (enumerating the factors that affect the involvement of civil society—
including non-state actors, NGOs, and civic associations—in the transitional justice
process).
195. See id. at 302 (noting the role that civil society organizations play in compiling
data and reporting abuses).
196. See id. at 304 (highlighting specific examples of services such as victimperpetrator mediation, memorials, public gatherings, medical care, and training and
educational programs).
197. See generally CHRISTOPHER KEITH HALL, SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT PROSECUTORIAL POLICY AND STRATEGY AND
EXTERNAL RELATIONS (2003).
198. See Wood, supra note 11, at 300 (opining that the competing interests between
the needs of legal justice and the victim’s interests impedes the function of the ICTR).
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in Rwanda eventually cut off all cooperation with the Tribunal after
repeated frustrating experiences.199
III. CONCLUSION
As a result of these outcomes, only a handful of defendants have been
found guilty of gender crimes, including Akayesu,200 Gacumbitsi,201
Semanza,202 and Muhimana.203 The history and the practice of the ICTR
vis-à-vis gender justice provide valuable negative lessons for the ICC. As a
result of the relentless work of advocates for gender justice during the
multilateral drafting of the ICC Statute, that treaty is not only characterized
by gender inclusiveness in its substantive law, but also in its structures and
procedures.204 In particular, the ICC Statute contains an expansive list of
gender crimes as war crimes and crimes against humanity, rendering it the
most progressive articulation of gender-based international criminal law in
history.205 Gender is listed as a ground—like ethnicity or race—on which
199. See NOWROJEE, supra note 13, at 5 (reporting that rather than punishment and
vengeance, Rwandan women wanted the ICTR to acknowledge their traumatic
experience and condemn the violence committed against them).
200. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-A, Appeal Chamber Judgment
(June 1, 2001).
201. Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-T, Trial Chamber Judgment
(June 17, 2004).
202. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Trial Chamber Judgment and
Sentence (May 15, 2003).
203. See Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR 95-1B-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment & Sentence, ¶¶ 534-563 (Apr. 28, 2005) (convicting the defendant of
committing or abetting many of the rapes alleged, but finding that there was
insufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s involvement in others), rev’d in part
Case No. ICTR 95-1B-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 46-53 (May 21, 1997)
(reversing the findings of criminal responsibility for two specific rapes where it was
unclear whether it was the defendant or someone else who had raped the women in
question, but affirming the finding of guilt for crimes against humanity with respect to
other acts of rape). Two judges dissented from the rape acquittals, arguing that it was
open to the Trial Chamber to find that it was the defendant who raped the women. See
Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR 95-1B-A, Jointly Partly Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Shahabuddeen and Judge Schomburg (May 21, 1997).
204. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Program of Action, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (July 12, 1993)
(reflecting the calls by NGOs and the United Nations for the integration of a gender
perspective into all aspects of the human rights system and for a focus on
accountability for violence against women); see also World Conference on Human
Rights, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994).
205. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi) (enumerating the
crimes of rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, and other forms of sexual violence as war crimes whether committed in
international or non-international armed conflict); see also id. art. 7(1)(g) (listing the
same set of crimes as crimes against humanity). Forced pregnancy is defined to mean
“the unlawful confinement, of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave
violations of international law.” Id. art. 7(2)(f). This language served as a last minute
compromise to placate delegations, most notably the Vatican and Ireland, who feared
that a reference to forced pregnancy would implicate national anti-abortion policies.
See Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 2, at 74. Enslavement as a crime against
humanity is also defined with reference to the trafficking of women and children. See
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(2)(c). In addition, acts of gender violence can also
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an individual or collective may be persecuted.206 With respect to the
possibility of charging genocidal rape, the definition of genocide in Article
6 mirrors that of the Genocide Convention.207 The Elements of Crimes—
drafted to assist the ICC in interpreting its substantive offenses—note that
serious bodily or mental harm “may include, but is not necessarily
restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading
treatment,”208 thus laying the foundation for future prosecutions of
genocidal rape before the ICC. The ICC Statute also contains a nondiscrimination provision stating that the ICC’s “application and
interpretation” of the law must be consistent with internationally
recognized human rights and be without adverse distinction founded on,
inter alia, gender.209 A number of procedural protections exist for victims
and witnesses.210
In terms of personnel, the Statute requires State parties to choose judges
and other staff with experience with “violence against women or
children”211 and calls for “fair representation of female and male judges.”212
The gender composition of the Court approaches parity in several
departments. Of the eighteen ICC judges, nine are now women.213 This
compares favorably to other international courts, whose composition is
heavily dominated by men.214 Forty-eight percent of professional positions
are now held by women; however, women are concentrated in the lower

be charged as the war crime of “committing outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment.” Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxi) (defining serious
violations of the laws and customs within the international armed conflicts); id. art.
8(2)(c)(ii) (outlining the same violations of the laws and customs of war within noninternational armed conflicts).
206. See Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(1)(h), 7(2)(g) (encompassing the
“intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law
by reason of the identity of the group of collectivity”). Before the ICC, however,
persecution is not a fully autonomous crime; rather, it may only be prosecuted where it
is connected to another crime against humanity or crime within the Rome Statute. Id.
art. 7(1)(h).
207. See id. art. 6(a)-(b), 6(b)(1) n.3 (defining “genocide” to mean various acts
“committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group . . .”); see also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 A (III), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 9, 1948).
208. Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 65, art. 6(b).
209. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 2(3).
210. See id. arts. 53-85 (promulgating the procedures for investigation, prosecution,
trial sentencing, and appeal). In addition, victims are entitled to counsel before the ICC
and may receive reparations from defendants (art. 75) or from a trust fund (arts. 79).
Id. art. 75(2), 79(2).
211. See id. arts. 36(8) (judges), 42(9) (prosecutor), & 43(6) (trauma experts in
Victims and Witnesses Unit).
212. Id. art. 36(8)(iii).
213. See The Judges–Biographical Notes (last visited Jan. 28, 2009),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Chambers/.
214. See Cherie Booth, Prospects and Issues for the International Criminal Court:
Lessons From Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 157, 162 (Philippe Sands ed., 2003)
(citing studies conducted of international courts, currently numbering over thirty, which
revealed that the vast majority of international judges are male).
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professional grades.215 The largest gender gap is found in the Office of the
Prosecutor, which boasts only forty-two percent women.216
So far, the ICC prosecutor is actively prosecuting crimes of gender
violence in most cases.217 Within the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) situation, both Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui have
been indicted for crimes against humanity and war crimes for the
commission of sexual slavery, rape, and outrages upon personal dignity.218
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, a citizen of the DRC who is implicated for his
involvement in crimes within the Central African Republic (CAR), will
likely be prosecuted for rape as a crime against humanity and a war
crime.219 Several Ugandan defendants are to be prosecuted for crimes of
sexual violence: sexual enslavement as a crime against humanity and rape
as a war crime or a crime against humanity.220 Both outstanding Darfur
215. WOMEN’S INITIATIVE FOR GENDER JUSTICE, ADVANCE PRELIMINARY REPORT–
STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 6 (2009), available at http://www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/Advance_
Preliminary_Report-Web_Final.pdf.
216. Id.
217. See WOMEN’S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE, MAKING A STATEMENT: A
REVIEW OF CHARGES AND PROSECUTIONS FOR GENDER-BASED CRIMES BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 8-9 (2008), available at http://www.iccwomen.org/
publications/articles/docs/MakingAStatement-Web_Final.pdf (discussing the existing
and potential gender violence charges and debrying lack of gender violence charges in
Lubanga); see also Oosterveld, supra note 18, at 128 (noting stronger gender violence
policies within the ICC prosecutorial office).
218. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 1-60 (Sept. 30, 2008). In connection with the
confirmation of the indictment against the two defendants, the Prosecutor requested
protective measures from the Registry for two witnesses whose testimony was relevant
to the sexual violence counts. The request was, however, rejected by the Registrar.
Nonetheless, the Prosecutor himself arranged for the preventative relocation of two
witnesses for their safety without authorization, citing his obligations to ensure the
security of witnesses under Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute. Id. ¶ 167; see also
Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Corrigendum to the
Decision on Evidentiary Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventative Relocation
and Disclosure under Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, ¶¶ 18-26
(Apr. 25, 2008) (detailing the lack of authority for prosecutorial action). At the
confirmation hearing, the Court ruled that even redacted or summary versions of the
witnesses’ testimony could not be admitted into evidence, because the witnesses were
in effect “unprotected” and thus at risk. Eventually, the witnesses were relocated by
the Registrar, which opened the way for their evidence to be considered and for the
reintroduction of the sexual violence charges. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case
No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Applications for Leave to Appeal the Decision
on the Admission of the Evidence of Witnesses 132 and 287 and on the Leave to
Appeal on the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 11 (Oct. 24, 2008). The
defendants’ request to appeal these decisions was rejected. Id. at 18.
219. See Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Warrant of Arrest
against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Replacing the Warrant of Arrest Issued on 23 May
2008, ¶¶ 17-18 (June 10, 2008).
220. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for
Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as amended on 27 September 2005, ¶ 42 (Sept. 27,
2005). Contra Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02-04 Warrant of Arrest for Okot
Odhiambo (July 8, 2005) (excluding sexual violence charges in the warrant against
Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen). Two Ugandan defendants, Vincent Otti and
Raska Lukwiya, have since died. See Uganda Rebels Drop Truce Demand, BBC
NEWS, Aug. 14, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4790049.stm (confirming the
death of Vincent Otti in late 2007).
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arrest warrants include gender violence counts (viz. rape, outrages upon
personal dignity, and persecutory gender violence).221 In addition, the
prosecutor has sought an indictment against Sudanese President Omar alBashir that features charges of gender violence, including rape as a
predicate act of genocide. Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo also
appointed feminist law professor Catherine MacKinnon as a dedicated
Gender Advisor,222 although the Court has yet to appoint a Gender Legal
Advisor for the entire institution.
The practice of the ICTR reveals that without a comprehensive
commitment to prosecuting gender crimes, defendants will enjoy effective
immunity for acts of gender violence, women will be systematically denied
justice, the trial record will not provide a definitive history of the full
reality of violence in the region in question, the expressive capacity of the
law will be undermined, and the system of international criminal law will
send a message that gender violence is not as serious or pervasive as other
forms of assault and mayhem. Over time, the perception of selective
justice will undermine the legitimacy of international criminal law and its
institutions as well as support for prosecutions within impacted
communities.223 In addition, the Security Council has confirmed in
Resolution 1820 that failing to prosecute crimes of gender violence
constitutes a threat to international peace and security.224 In that
Resolution, the Security Council stressed the importance of ending
impunity for such acts and ensuring women and children equal protection
under the law and equal access to justice.225 To this end, the Council called
on states to exclude sexual violence crimes from any amnesty provisions
promulgated in conflict resolution processes. By recognizing that acts of
sexual violence are serious, exacerbate armed conflict, and are often the
result of a deliberate policy to subjugate an entire enemy community,
Resolution 1820 helps to counter arguments that sexual violence is a
private or peripheral matter, unconnected to public events of international
importance.226 With the implementation of the Security Council-mandated
221. See Prosecutor v. Harun & Adb-al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07,
Warrant of Arrest for Ali Kushayb, 6-16 (Apr. 27, 2007) (charging acts of rape as
crimes against humanity and war crimes); Prosecutor v. Harun & Abd-al-Rahman,
Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun, 6-15 (Apr. 27, 2007)
(charging the same set of crimes as Ali Kushayb); see also Prosecutor v. Harun & Abdal-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision on the Prosecution Application under
Article 58(7) of the Statute (Apr. 27, 2007).
222. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Appoints Prof.
Catharine A. MacKinnon as Special Adviser on Gender Crimes (Nov. 26, 2008),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/450.html.
223. Wood, supra note 11, at 299-300 (noting that the ICTR’s legacy of lack of
gender justice will impact the perception of the legitimacy of the Tribunal in the eyes
of the Rwandan public).
224. S.C. Res. 1820, supra note 6, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008).
225. Id. ¶ 4.
226. See id. (recognizing that sexual violence may be charged as “a war crime, a
crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide” that implicates
international security concerns).
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Completion Strategy, it is largely too late for Rwanda’s women to enjoy
gender justice. The ICC must do better for the rest of Africa’s women.
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